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CATALYST FOR CHANGE: MUTUAL FUNDS
IN CANADA
DANIEL J. BAUM*
The growth of the mutual funds industry in the last thirty
years has been spectacular, both in the United States and in Canada.
Although a superficial comparison of the industries in these coun-
tries might indicate a high deg-ree of similarity, the industry in
Canada operates 'within a surprisingly different framework, bothfrom the standpoint of regulation and taxation. The effect of
this framework on fund behavior, however, is not easily predict-
able. This in-depth examination of the Canadian mutual funds in-
dustry describes the framework 'within which that industry oper-
ates and the resulting effects on fund behavior. In doing so, it
provides the basis for a comparison between the mutual funds
industry of Canada and that of the United States which, at least
by inference, suggests that certain patterns of fund behavior may
be endemic to the industry, whether it be Canadian or American,
and, accordingly, in regulating that industry that there are certain
factors worthy of consideration, no matter where in North
America the industry is operating.
PROFILE IN LAW
INTRODUCTION: THE LACK OF A REGULATORY SCHEME
Canadian mutual funds have served as a catalyst in the dramatic change
in the role of financial institutions during which many banks,' life in-
"Professor, Faculties of Law and Administrative Studies, Osgoode Hall Law School,
York University, Toronto. Research on this article was funded by the Ford Foundation
Grant to the Faculty of Administrative Studies, York University. The author expresses
his deep appreciation to members of the Canadian Mutual Funds Association and the
Toronto Stock Exchange for their assistance and critique. The views expressed in this
article are solely those of the author.
1 Concerned with their legal right to sell investment advice, only three of the nine
Canadian banks have entered into mutual fund relations. Two of them, however, rank
among the five largest banks holding 90 percent of that industry's assets. Furthermore,
it is worth noting that the two, the Toronto-Dominion Bank and the Royal Bank of
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surance2 and trust companies3 have become financial conglomerates.
The newest, and still the smallest in asset size, of the institutional inves-
tors, the mutual fund has aided in bringing this departure from single-line
functions and, as a result, has spurred competition between different
classes of institutional investors.
Each type of institutional investor seems to have fashioned the mutual
fund device to suit a particular end. Although the investment fund of
Canada, have interests in the Investors Group which controls more than a third of
the nation's mutual fund assets.
Primarily, the two banks serve as sales outlets through their many branch offices.
In this regard, the Toronto-Dominion takes 8.5 percent commission of fund shares
sold while the Royal Bank receives nothing. However, the Royal Bank for a related
fund, Royfund, acts as accountant, transfer agent, and custodian; and, through the
management company of Investors, the Toronto-Dominion shares in compensation paid
for investment advice. See CANADIAN COMMzvi. oN MUrUAL FuNDs AND INVESTMENT
CoNTRACTs, REPORT (1969) [hereinafter referred to as MUTUAL FUND CoMmrra
REPORT].
2TnE CANADIAN LIE INSURANCE Ass'm SUBMISSION To THE CANADIAN Co/ATM. ON
MUTUAL FUNDs AND INVEsTMENT CONTRACTS, June 1968, at 12 [hereinafter cited as Lirn
INSURANCE SUBMISSION].
At that time these funds had total assets of $207 million, of which $15 million related
to out-of-Canada business.
In Canada emphasis had been on pooled variable funds, where a number of policy-
holders participate in the investment results of the same fund. At the end of 1967,
18 of the 21 companies had each set up one pooled equity (i.e., a variable -fund
invested primarily in common stocks) and two companies had two pooled equity
funds, each for a different class of policyholders. One company did not have an
equity fund.
In addition, five companies had established pooled equity funds for out-of-Canada
policyholders. Ten of the 21 companies had established fixed-income pools (i.e., a
variable fund invested in fixed-income types of investment). Three of these companies
had two fixed-income funds, one invested in bonds and the other in mortgages. Two
companies had only a mortgage fund, one had only a bond fund while the remaining
four combined bonds and mortgages in one fund.
Most of the companies are prepared to establish nonpooled funds for large group
pension policyholders. Sixteen such funds had been established by eight companies.
3 After a period of experiment with the operation of registered retirement savings
plans, several trust companies expanded their range of services to include funds in
which clients wishing portfolio management could invest their money and from
which they could withdraw at any time. For many years, the trust companies had
provided portfolio management on an individual basis to meet the needs of larger
clients and one of the objectives was to provide similar services to clients with smaller
amounts of money available for investment. Here, as with funds for registered
retirement savings plans, most of the trust companies organized two or more funds
to provide clients with a choice of investment objectives; again as with funds for
registered retirement savings plans, the equity-oriented funds have been proven most
popular. Since the first major trust company investment fund was created by The
Canada Trust Company in 1959, investments in the equity sections of this and other
such funds have grown to over $87 million (at the end of 1967). MUTUAL FUND
ComurrIEE REPORT.
CANADIAN MUTUAL FtmNDs
a trust company may bear direct resemblance to a mutual fund, there is a
substantive difference between a company's larger pooled fund opera-
tion of a retirement or pension scheme4 and the operation of a mutual
fund. The variable annuity of the life insurance company serves many
ends,. with some companies integrating the equity investment with the
regular life endowment or term insurance and others basing cash values
on investment performance.5 Thus, in using the monies of individual
investors for equity purchases, these financial institutions are using a
device analogous to the mutual fund and one which is flexible enough
to suit the needs of each particular institution. Like the trust company,
the bank manager can wait for the customer to seek him in the normal
course of events, whereas the life insurance company, like most mutual
funds, must solicit customers. The trust, bank, or life insurance company
can encumber the fund bought and can impede the right of share re-
demption based on the net asset value, the most basic characteristic of
a mutual fund;6 variable annuity growth can go into life insurance
premiums and a trust company can operate equity-based retirement
schemes that demand the absence of redemption for a stated period as
a condition to tax deferment for the monies contributed.7
All financial institutions have become equity oriented. While accel-
erating this process, investment funds account for only a small portion
of bank, trust, or life insurance assets. Thus, at the end of 1967, life in-
surance assets were $13 billion, with the industry's variable funds repre-
senting only 1.5 percent of the total.8 Administered by trust companies,
investment funds that could be characterized as mutual funds had assets
of $87 million' while trusteed pension funds alone, handled by trust
and life insurance companies, had assets of $7.1 billion."0
As an industry, banking dwarfs the mutual funds. At the end of 1968,
4 A qualified retirement or pension scheme is one which would inhibit the right of
redemption before the date of retirement; that is, monies paid into the plan would
not be taxed until the due date for retirement. While in practice the individual could
demand and receive monies in advance of retirement he would lose the advantage of tax
deferment.
5LwE INsuRAwcE SUBMIssIow 31, 32.
6 MuTuAL FutN CoMimrEE REPORT 50, 51. The distinction between sought and un-
sought goods is a real one. Often the consumer seeks out the bank or trust company
branch manager for assistance, for investment advice. Here the consumer takes the
initiative in the purchase of mutual or investment shares. This is quite different than
the mutual fund or insurance salesman who knocks on doors for the purpose of making
a sale.
7 See note 4 supra.
8 Ln INSuRANCE SuaMissloN 2.
9 MUTUAL FUND CoMmai= REPORT 13.
IOld. at 10, 121.
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the nine banks of Canada held $36.7 billion in assets, the five largest
banks accounting for more than 90 percent of the total.' Any one of
these five largest banks has nearly twice the total assets of all the Cana-
dian mutual funds; total mutual fund assets at the end of 1967 were $2.7
billion, and the largest fund complex, the Investors Group, which was
partially owned by two Canadian banks, held $915.7 million.' 2
The evolving complex of Canadian financial institutions is striving to
meet, anticipate, and stimulate all types of consumer financial needs. In
such a setting, the difficulty of regulating mutual funds without com-
parable regulation over variable annuities, investment funds or retirement
funds is patent. In Canada, there is presently no comprehensive regu-
latory scheme for the mutual fund industry. There are no pervasive
rules of conduct fashioned by a regulatory agency holding a broad grant
of legislative authority.
In assessing the scope and efficacy of potential regulation, an examina-
tion of investment behavior is vital to an understanding not only of
fund goals, but also of the impact of fund competition with institutional
giants. Unlike a large bank or trust company, a fund offers a single-line
product; the most effective avenue for fund competition and growth is
performance, which depends solely on the choice of investments. To be
attractive, especially in a rising market, funds must pursue ever greater
returns at, what must be assumed, even greater risk."s It follows that
fund management is not apt to embrace eagerly government regulation
that restricts its freedom to engage in high risk investment and to com-
pete effectively for capital with other larger and more diversified fi-
nancial institutions. Thus, in any analysis of existing law or proposed
regulatory schemes, the attitude of the regulated must be carefully
11 The exact figure is $36,698,817,000, based on "Statement of the Assets and Liabilities
of the Chartered Banks of Canada as of December 31, 1968."
Bank Assets
The Royal Bank of Canada $ 9.2 billion
The Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce $ 8.4 billion
The Bank of Montreal S 6.99 billion
The Bank of Nova Scotia $ 5.21 billion
The Toronto Dominion Bank S 4.5 billion
La Banque Canadienne Nationale $ 1.5 billion
Banque Provinciale de Canada $759 million
Mercantile Bank of Canada $190 million
Bank of British Columbia $ 36 million
12 See note 1 supra.
13Publle acceptance of the "venture" fund and the concommitant higher level of
risk has not only resulted in an increase, both in number and size, of such funds, but
has also caused some conventional funds to reexamine their own investment policies.
See MuruAL FtmN CoALNm-r. REPoRT 1.
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weighed. Unless the law is quite specific and the agency capacity and
willingness to enforce that law unambiguous, full compliance on the
part of a hostile industry cannot be expected.
The existence of an unstructured regulatory scheme in a burgeoning
industry whose members need a certain freedom to act set the need and
the tone for a unique governmental study by the Canadian Committee
on Mutual Funds and Investment Contracts. The study was initiated in
late 1969 under the direction of federal and provincial securities of-
ficials. It was funded jointly by the federal government and all the
provinces. The creation of the Committee resulted from the spectacular
growth of open-ended mutual funds and the awareness that mutual funds
were subject to a variety of legislation, most of which was not specifical-
ly tailored for them and created many difficulties in application. There
was also concern with the lack of regulatory provisions designed to deal
with the resulting competition by other financial institutions.14
The Committee report includes in-depth recommendations for an in-
dustry regulatory scheme and deals with a few matters that provide in-
sight into what emerges as the limited role of law. Initially, the report
faced the problem of specifically defining mutual funds so that a charter
of rights and responsibilities could be drafted. In the context of competi-
tion for capital between financial institutions, there was ample justifica-
tion for the Committee to seek a definition that would encompass any
pooled fund with public participation. To do this, however, would re-
quire regulation over diverse institutions which offer varied instruments
for public subscription and which have long been subject to administra-
tion by a number of specialized agencies.
Facing these considerations, the Committee defined a mutual fund in
terms of the instrument being sold rather than on the basis of competi-
tion for consumer monies; a mutual fund share, however, differs from a
tax-deferred retirement fund and many other kinds of variable annuities
in that the fund share may be redeemed at any time at net asset value.15
The Committee was of the opinion that, for definitional purposes, reliance
on the nature of the instrument issued made the nature of the business
carried on by the organization irrelevant." Although this definition
14 Id. at iv.
15 The Committee Report stresses the characteristic of redemption as the distinguishing
characteristic of a mutual fund. Id. at 115. The legal reality today, however, is quite
different. There is not absolute right either to immediate redemption or to redemption
in cash rather than underlying securities of the fund. This point is not fully discussed
in the Committee Report.
ltOld. at 114. The Committee leaves no doubt that the overriding concern in the
definition of a fund is redemption: "[Olur recommended definition ... focuses on
19701
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would permit precision in drafting a regulatory scheme, it would also
provide other financial institutions with considerable incentive when
establishing their own investment funds to deviate from the redemption
features of the mutual fund in order to avoid broad governmental regu-
lation and, thereby, to gain a considerable competitive advantage. The
report conceded that the definition does not mark an obvious separation
between types of financial instruments; for example, it does not include
variable policies of life insurance companies and the segregated funds
on which they are based, even though such policies are directly competi-
tive with mutual funds.'7
The report recommended that, as a matter of public policy, the regu-
19tory scheme proposed for mutual funds be adjusted to cover similar
financial arrangements.' 8 The report sought to isolate the elements
common to mutual fund operations, to make suggestions that would
give the public uniform substantive protection, and not to place mutual
funds at a competitive disadvantage. The report nevertheless accepted
the reality of specialized regulation; although each institution may com-
pete for the same savings dollar, there is a core distinction which justi-
fies continued specialized, administrative regulation. Unlike a mutual
fund which is subject to generalized control by a securities commission,
other financial institutions should have the uniform, substantive law
separately administered; if greater disclosure is desirable for some kinds
of variable annuities, the details of prospectuses and their implementa-
tion should be set by a superintendent of insurance, not by a securities
commission.19
There are a number of difficulties with such recommendations, all of
which point to the near impossibility of uniform administration. At a
simplistic level, different agencies employing staffs of different quality
will differ in their individual decisions. For example, there would be no
advisory ruling from a securities commission that the prospectus of a
life insurance company's variable annuity plan is deficient in its state-
ment of investment policy, redemption features, and sales charges. The
decision would be made by an insurance department operating within
the framework of its own traditions and experience. Historically, the
agencies which regulate insurance companies have had an industry orien-
the redeemability of shares or units rather than their continuous distribution to the
public." Id. at 115.
17 Id. at 614.
IId.
19 Id. at 636. In part, for constitutional reasons (since banking is subject to exclusive
federal jurisdiction) the report recommends establishment of a national sales training
program that could be shaped by the banking industry. Id. at 624.
[Vol. 59:249
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tation 20 and their concern has been with adequate reserves, with the
capacity of the industry to meet its obligations, and with keeping the
industry in a competitive position vis-a-vis other financial institutions.
Their concern is not the implementation of a general standard of dis-
closure. Mutual funds do not share this advantage. The securities com-
mission in any province is not in existence primarily to oversee the funds.
Therefore, there is not the same opportunity to develop a community of
interest in which a commission would dedicate itself to the preservation
and promotion of a viable fund industry through interpretation of law
and recommendations for reform.21
From the community of interest which develops between the agency
charged with administering broad grants of power over a designated
industry and the industry itself comes an exchange of confidence. The
regulators and the regulated are unlikely to disclose decisions actually
made, or the reasons for these decisions. 22 Formal rules and policy state-
ments of general application are less likely to be forthcoming than ad
hoe informal adjudication, which by its very nature encourages still more
confidential interchange and only reinforces the cycle of secrecy.2
There is a certain vitality in general law generally administered which
is lacking in special law specially administered. Should the committee
20 The best evidence of agencies with industry orientation can be seen in the legisla-
tion they proposed which permitted both banks and insurance companies wider activity
to meet competition. See Bank, Act, CAN. STAT. c. 87 (1967); Canadian & British
Insurance Companies Act, CAN. REv. STAT. c. 31, S 81 (1952), as amended, CAN. STAT.
c. 13, S 16 (1961); Foreign Insurance Companies Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 125, § 37
(1952), as amended, CAN. STAT. c. 16, § 4 (1961); The Insurance Act, ONT. REv. STAT.
c. 190, § 80 (1960), as amended, Ont. Stat. c. 63, § 3 (1962).
21 "Anyone, for example, who follows the activities of the Department of Agriculture
comes to feel (though this is no doubt an exaggeration) that the Department is a glorified
farmer's lobby. An examination of the milk licensing activities suggests the enormous
power of the farm cooperatives .... " L. JAFFE, JuDicIAL CO NROL oF ADMInSRATrV
AcrioN 23, 24 (1965). Although an executive department, not an independent regulatory
authority, has been described, the analogy is not inapposite since there is but a small
step between milk licensing and licensing or chartering a bank, trust, or insurance
company.
22Writng of the United States, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis stated: "The banking
agencies of the federal government have long maintained systems of secret evidence,
secret law and secret policy. The result has been a degree of unchecked and un-
structured discretionary power that is far greater than it should be." Davis, Administra-
tive Procedure in the Regulation of Banking, 31 LAw & CoNTEmP. PRoB. 713 (1967).
See also K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JusTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 120-22 (1969),
2 3 Lack of definite standards creates a void into which attempts to influence are
bound to rush; legal Vacuums are quite like physical ones in that respect. Although
pressure produces diffuse decisions, it is likewise true that diffuse decisions produce
pressure; and pressure from one party to a case, or even a reasonable fear of it, arising
from experience, will produce pressure from others.' H. FRiENDLY, BENcrvARms:
SE ED PAPERs BY AN EMINENT FEDERAL JuDGE 104 (1967).
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report be implemented by provincial securities commissions, mutual
funds would be required to include an in-depth statement of investment
policy in their prospectuses. Perhaps variable policies, which are in direct
competition with the funds and which are under the control of a superin-
tendent of insurance, should be subject to similar disclosure require-
ments24 and, thus, the same generalized regulation as the funds. The
Committee report is the first all-government review of mutual funds. It
proposes a comprehensive scheme of substantive regulation. Yet, even in
terms of simply making recommendations, it promulgates a constricted
view of coverage, as well as a failure to accept the reality of the financial
conglomerate and the need for a regulatory agency empowered to deal
with that conglomerate as a whole.
Today Canada enjoys no comprehensive regulatory scheme over
mutual funds. There is no regulatory agency, federal or provincial,
that views its function as one necessitating or permitting the imposition
of pervasive rules of conduct for this growing and changing industry.
Rather, there is fragmentation and jurisdiction divided between levels
of government, between branches of the same government, and between
governmental agencies and self-regulatory associations established by
the industries concerned 25
The Canadian mutual funds industry, however, is subject to existing
laws and self-regulation bearing directly on investment behavior. Specif-
ically, there is the Income Tax Act, the prospectus requirements of a
securities act, and the law of incorporation. All of these directly affect
the funds industry. Their relevance, the vigor with which they are im-
plemented, and the industry's view of their function in the context of
law are the substance of this article. Where provincial legislation is
24 In recent years, investment media essentially similar to those issued by
mutual funds have begun to be issued by trust companies, banks and in-
surance companies. Trust companies operate pooled common stock trust
funds against which certificates are issued. Banks have established mutual
fund subsidiaries which are operated, at present, under the same legisla-
tion as mutual funds. Some insurance companies have begun issuing
"variable annuity" contracts which are, in effect, mutual fund plans with
some insurance features. Some of these instruments are issued under the
legislation governing the parent institution, some under the Securities
Acts .... In our view it is imperative that disclosure by these media be
placed on a comparable basis. The primary reason is to ensure that the
investor has information pertinent to his investment decision. A secondary
reason is to ensure that all institutions offering such investments compete
on an equal basis.
Paper 9: The Role of Formal Disclosure in Providing Information to Investors, in
QunRN & WATERS, A STUDY OF THE CANADIAN MUTUAL FuNDs INDUsTRY 9-3 (1969).
25 MUTUAL FuNDs CoMAi. rarE RE ORT 715.
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considered, especially that relating to prospectus requirements, only
the law of Ontario is set forth. It is true that the law of Quebec or
British Columbia may operate on mutual funds desiring to sell shares in
those provinces, and that funds may be subject not only to multiple
prospectus requirements, but also to increased costs that accompany
compliance with the law. Ontario, however, has set the lead for other
provinces in securities regulation. The Ontario Securities Act of 1966
has become a model for many provinces; moreover, the 86 mutual funds
qualified for sale in Ontario, which possess the bulk of industry assets,
tend to follow in other provinces the Ontario practice concerning pro-
spectuses; therefore, the Ontario legislation is fairly representative of
general practice.26
THE INCOME TAX ACT
The literal structure of Canadian tax law should have a significant
impact not only on fund investment behavior but also on the desirability
of the fund as an investment medium. Through its administration, how-
ever, the federal taxing authority has softened the impact of law; never-
theless, there is nothing certain about the unarticulated exercise of dis-
cretion, and the law literally applied could have dramatic effect on the
fund industry.
From a tax standpoint, the existing status of the funds is clear: funds
are not taxed as businesses in terms of profits derived from the sale of
securities27 and fund shareholders are favored with tax-free treatment on
profits derived from the sale of securities since capital gains are not
taxed in Canada. In a rising market, funds can become attractive as an
investment medium. The fund itself incurs no tax liability on the pur-
chase or sale of shares for its portfolio. Furthermore, due partly to
government restraint, the fund may be able to engage in frequent trades
-in high turnover of given issues-without substantial fear of having
the profit it obtains treated as ordinary income. Thus, the fund as an
institution may be able to achieve what the individual cannot, namely,
capital gains treatment while engaging in the trade of dealing in securi-
ties and buying and selling without the intent of investing.
The initial question is whether a mutual fund, whether organized as
a corporation or as a trust, is in the business of trading in securities. If
it is, the profits derived are likely to be treated as ordinary income, and
26 I. at 576.
27 Losses, of course, would not be deductible from ordinary income. Indeed, this
aspect of the subject may account in part for the position of the taxing authority. See
Gulf Securities Co. v. Minister Na'l Revenue, 10 Can. Tax App. Bd. 338, 341 (1954).
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it will be difficult for the fund, so characterized, to allocate any of its
monies to an investment account. The Report of The Royal Comnis-
sion on Taxation in 1966 stated: "[U]nder existing tax law, security
gains earned as a result of trading activities are taxable, but if derived
from investment activities they are not subject to tax. Some financial
institutions find themselves in the peculiar position of being taxed on
some of those gains and not on others." 28 Banks, trusts, and insurance
companies may be able to separate functions; mutual funds have diffi-
culty in doing so since their singular function is the achievement of a
specific investment policy.
The Income Tax Act of 1952 comes into play by defining those sub-
ject to income tax. If mutual funds are considered a trade or an adven-
ture or concern in the nature of a trade, they may have their profits
subject to tax, and their losses deductible from ordinary income.2 1 Prec-
edent was set as early as 1904 in California Copper Syndicate v. Harris,30
where the court treated returns from the sale of a portion of the com-
pany's property as income and distinguished between a mere change in
the form of investments and the conduct of a trade or business.
By 1956, in Minister Nat'l Revenue v. Taylor,1 the Exchequer Court
had established the first Canadian judicial guidelines to aid in determin-
ing whether a particular transaction was one in the nature of trade. At
issue was the purchase, in a short-supply market, of 1500 tons of lead
284 ROYAL COMM' ON TAXATION, TAXATION OF INCOME 383 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as CARTER CoMM'N REPORT]. The Carter Commission would subject all capital
gains to tax.
29 The inclusion of a broad definition of "business" in section 127(1) (e) of
the Income Tax Act of 1948 (now section 139(1) (e) of the Income Tax
Act of 1952) substantially enlarged the ambit of the kind of transactions
the profits from which are subject to income tax. The definition no doubt
was taken from The Income Tax Act of the United Kingdom, section
156(1) of which defines "trade!' as including "every trade, manufacture,
adventure or conceri in the niture of trade." The Canadian definition is
of even wider scope; in that "'business' includes a profession, calling,
trade, manufacture of undertaking of any kind 'wbatsoe.er and includes
an adventure or concern in.the nature of trade but does not include an
office or employment." (emphasis added).
D. SHaRBANIux, Tim CONCEPT OF INcom--Tam RECEUTS SIDE, SrUDiES or THE ROYAL
CoMMsIsioN ON TAXATION No. 20, at 46-47 (1968).
305 Tax Cas. 159, 165-67 (Scot. Exch. 1904). California Copper Syndicate has been
distinguished in a number of cases on the basis of intent. In Tebrau Rubber Syndicate,
Ltd. v. Farmer, the company's prospectus was used to establish investment intent.
5 Tax Cas. 658, 665-66 (Scot. Exch. 1910). For the mutual fund industry there is
an obvious lesson to be learned from such use. It is at this point that the role of a
securities commission, such as the Ontario Securities Commission, can come into play
through its control over a fund's prospectus by forcing full and true disclosure.
31 [1956] Can. Tax Cas. 189, 210-12 (Exch. Ct.).
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by the general manager of a metal products company. The lead was
sold to the company at a substantial profit. The manager not only made
a profit but advanced his position, gained prestige, and achieved an in-
crease in salary and pension rights. Ruling that the profit was ordinary
income and not a capital gain, the court said that neither the singleness
of the transaction nor the nonexistence of an organization was solely
determinative of whether the transaction was an adventure in the nature
of trade.32 Rather, it was the nature of the specific transaction which
had to be examined, as well as the manner in which the transaction was
conducted. The nature and quantity of the subject matter may also be
determinative."3
The Taylor criteria have been imposed in a number of cases involving
brokerage houses, and even in one case involving a trust designed to
operate in much the same manner as a mutual fund. Brokerage houses
buying for their own account 4 and a mutual fund buying fund shares
from those seeking redemption and later reselling at a profit 5 have had
their gains classified as income. The transactions in which they were en-
gaged were held to constitute ordinary business and were neither for in-
vestment nor for the purpose of receiving dividends or interest.
The status of funds which serve as intermediaries in the purchase or
sale of securities has never been ruled on as such. An argument can be
made that funds or their equivalent are engaged in the trade of pur-
chasing and selling securities, and that profits or losses derived from such
transactions should be considered ordinary income or deductions from
ordinary income. The only published statement affording a quasi-official
counter-view comes from the Royal Commission on Taxation, such
statement equating investment funds which pool public investment with
conduits between the income source and the investor,36 and, thus, not
viewing the mutual fund as a separate taxable entity. Funds are entities,
however, over which there is managerial control. Pursuant to this con-
trol, securities are bought and sold, and management's compensation is
32 Id. at 1137.
33 D. SHmrBANnn, supra note 29, at 47-48.
34 McMahon & Burns Ltd. v. Minister Nat'1 Revenue, [1956] Can. Tax Cas. 153,
157-58 (Exch. Ct.). An investment dealer, part of a underwriting group, took a portion
of an issue for its own account as an invesunent. The court held: "Buying for Jack
or buying for Jill seem pretty well alike [that is, buying for resale or buying for
investment in terms of the underwriting] and it would require a subtler mind to single
out any real objective distinction in this case . . . ." Id. at 1094. See also, Gairdner
Securities Ltd. v. Minister Nat'l Revenue, [19541 Can. Tax Cas. 24, 27; Norman R.
Whitall v. Minister Nat'1 Revenue, [1967] Cas. Tax Cas. 377, 393.
35 Minister Nat'l Revenue v. Independence Founders Ltd.; [1953] Can. Tax Cas. 310.
36 CARTER COM-M' REPoRT 17.
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in direct relation to the volume of portfolio turnover and, most im-
portandy, to fund performance.37
However suspect the analogy, the fund industry for the moment is
regarded as a conduit in the purchase and sale of securities. In an in-
flationary economy, this should add to the ability of mutual funds, and
those institutions performing similar functions, to attract capital, since
no additional tax is levied at the institutional level. It is necessary, how-
ever, to buy for investment in order for there to be capital gains treat-
ment upon a subsequent sale or disposition, and it is certainly not clear
what the tax treatment will be on a fund which embarks upon a policy
of leveraging issues-taking heavy positions, sparking a rise in issue price,
and then selling its position.
In Gairdner Securties Ltd. v. Minister Nat'l Revenue,8 the Supreme
Court of Canada held that gains derived from a taxpayer's in-out trading
were to be treated as ordinary income. Of 22,260 shares purchased by
Gairdner after 1946, 2,000 were resold the same day, 1,000 within one
month, 2,500 within two months, and 3,500 within six months. Gairdner
contended that these purchases and sales were merely changes in invest-
ment. The Court held that:
Investments, in the sense urged, look primarily to the maintenance
of an annual return in dividends or interest. Substitutions in the
securities take place, but they are designed to further that primary
purpose and are subsidiary to it. On the facts before us, there
cannot, in my opinion, be any real doubt that there was no such
dominant purpose here.39
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the funds would be compelled
to accede to more conservative investment behavior to insure ongoing
capital gains treatment; therefore, there would be limits to the "go-go"
or "in-out" fund. As a matter of law, funds would buy to hold, since
to do otherwise would place funds in the position of trading and not
investing, thus having their profits treated as income.
Although the general import of the law seems clear, administrative
interpretation, at least as manifested by silence, puts that law in a dif-
ferent cast. Mutual funds have not been inhibited in their trading pat-
37 In Anderson Logging Co. v. The King, it was held: "The sole raison d'etre of
a public company is to have a business and to carry it on. If the transaction in question
belongs to a class of profit-making operations contemplated by the memorandum of
association, prima facie, at all events, the profit derived from it is a profit derived
from the business of the company." [1917-1927J Can. Tax Cas. 198, 207 (1924).
38 [1954] Can. Tax Cas. 24, 27.
Id. at 1016.
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terns by the tax laws. The statistics seem to indicate that while "in-out"
trading may be limited in the Canadian equity market, many Canadian
funds regard the United States market as a locus for secondary liquidity,
for investment that may be substantial and quickly liquidated.40 The
present high frequency of trading by mutual funds seems to be based
upon administrative silence in Ottawa. To date there have been no
publicly challenged fund transactions-no attempts to have profits from
share trading declared income-by the taxing authorities.
The funds cannot be blamed for relying upon implied agency inter-
pretation. After all, the obligation of fund directors is to act in the inter-
ests of their shareholders within the limits set by law. On the other
hand, the difficulties facing the taxing authority cannot be ignored. The
pool of fund investors is in constant flux. Redemptions may be made at
any time as a matter of right. A fund may engage in a transaction
which it believes deserves capital gains treatment and its portfolio will
be valued accordingly. Redemption may take place. Should the taxing
authority disagree with the treatment given, it is not easy to say who will
be penalized and who will be benefited. Thus, until rules can be shaped,
Canadian mutual funds enjoy administrative freedom from what could
be constricting law. 41
What has been said of mutual funds could be applied to other insti-
tutional investors in Canada. The reason for focusing on funds in rela-
tion to the tax laws is that it is they who are primarily concerned with
the equity market and, as a matter of competition, have probed the
profit of high volume trading through the venture or speculative fund.
From the all-government committee report on mutual funds came
factual confirmation of the funds' ambivalent behavior in light of the
tax laws. Addressing itself to the period 1962-1967, the report stated:
Canadian mutual funds are constrained in their trading practices by
the necessity of having gains made on the sale of securities taxed
as ordinary income. Their objective is to show that the policy fol-
lowed is to invest rather than trade. For this reason the investment
managers attempt to restrict portfolio turnover; many follow a
40 See Paper 14: Investment in U.S. and Foreign Securities, in QUIRIN & WATERS, A
STUDy OF THE CANADIAN MUTUAL FUNDS INDUSTRY 14-1 (1969); Paper 15: Problems of
Investing in Canadian Securities: Market Thinness and Disclosure Standards of Canadian
Corporations, in QUIRIN & WATERS, A STMUY OF THE CANADIAN MUTUAL FuNDs INDusrRY
15-1-3 (1969).
41Again, the impact of other law, such as the prospectus requirements of provinces
like Ontario, must be considered. The primary statutory thrust is in terms of investment
behavior related to capital gains treatment and the question of the, fund as a trading
enterprise. But see CARTER ComM'N REPoRT 18.
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policy against the realization of a capital gain until the particular
securities have been held for, say, a year. In spite of this restric-
tion, the proportionate volume of trading has increased substan-
tially in recent years.42
The increase in turnover has not come from Canadian funds trading in
Canadian securities, but rather from Canadian funds trading in U.S. se-
curities. 4 Indeed, the difference in turnover rate is so significant that the
Committee felt that fund managers followed different investment poli-
cies in the two markets. 44
Viewing the Canadian market, the Committee found a stabilizing in-
fluence in fund trading patterns on the basis of the data obtained. In
part, this results from the thinness of the Canadian market; it is not dif-
ficult for institutions to absorb substantial portions of outstanding stock
with relative ease. 45 Such positions, however, often can be obtained only
when markets are falling and abandoned when the price is rising;46 in
this way, funds frequently trade against the market and thereby serve
as a stabilizing force.
Considering the realities of investment behavior, the Committee made
a number of suggestions designed to allow funds greater flexibility, the
essence of which was to place funds in the same position as individuals
to the extent consistent with institutional operations. 47 The Committee
recommended the establishment of two kinds of funds, conventional and
42 MuruAL FuNi ComMsrrE REPoRT 83.
43 d. at 84.
44 Id. at 86.
45 The activities of the financial institutions are the most crucial aspect in any
assessment of the possible future demands for Canadian stocks. Over the
next few years the total equity holdings of the major financial institutions
could easily grow to triple their 1966 holdings. The holdings of foreign
stocks by these institutions are already substantial, and if they find it
necessary to invest half of their total equity portfolios in foreign equities
(because of the inadequacy of domestic supply) by the early 1970's they
could be holding $5 billion in foreign equities.
G. CoNWAY, Tim SUPPLY OF, AND DEmAND FoR, CANADIAN EQUITIEs 43 (1968).
46 MrUAL FUND CoMzvna REPORT 89.
47Funds should differ from individuals only in the sense of being able to meet
demands for redemption. This qualification would place some constraints on liquidity
and on the type of investments funds might make. Thus, it would be improper for a
fund to own a building, even though it might be entirely appropriate for it to own
shares in a real estate development corporation. So, too, a fund should insure a cash
flow sufficient to meet redemption demands at share net asset value. To do this,
however, a fund should not be permitted to borrow the entire worth of its net
assets. See id.
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nonconventional. 4 For the investor seeking a nonconventional fund, one
with specialized investment objectives not presently followed by mem-
bers of the industry, the Committee sought limited accommodation. The
nonconventional fund would be permitted, inter alia, to effect short
sales and to borrow money for leverage and for the purpose of effecting
redemptions, provided that its total liabilities for all three at no time
should exceed 75 percent of its borrowing base.49 The difficulty under
present Canadian tax law is patent. A fund having as investment ob-
jectives short sales or leverage could not, under any circumstances, be
characterized as an investor; the fund would be trading, and its gains
or losses would be treated as ordinary income. It must be assumed that
the Committee understood the import of its recommendations. Properly
labelled as such, the speculative fund was not to be discouraged, for it
might further stimulate competition in the fund industry; 0 at the same
time, the Committee did not seek to change the distinction between
capital gains and ordinary income. It sought only to allow greater in-
stitutional investment flexibility.
Whatever the Committee intended, there is every likelihood that the
capital gains-ordinary income distinction will be altered materially. In
1969 the Government published a White Paper, Proposals for Tax Re-
form,51 which proposed that all gains and losses, except those incurred
in sales of stock of Canadian widely held corporations, be treated as
ordinary income. Thus, for the mutual fund dealing in U.S. securities,
the proposed Canadian tax laws would offer no particular incentive in
terms of seeking capital gains as contrasted to ordinary income;52 how-
ever, for those trading in stock of Canadian widely held corporations,
which would include any corporation listed on a Canadian stock ex-
change,53 the historic distinction would still have a considerable meaning.
4 See id. A nonconventional fund could be defined in the negative. It would be
what a conventional fund is not in terms of investment objectives.
49 Id. at 434, 435.
50 One of the principal thrusts of this report is toward a more highly com-
petitive structure within the mutual fund industry, so that it will better
serve the investing public. There is a role, and an important role, to be
played by mutual funds with specialized investment objectives and
practices designed to cater to investors with particular needs, even if
these mutual funds make use of investment practices inconsistent with the
restrictions presently in effect.
id. at 421-22.
61E. BENSON, PRoPoSALS FOR TAx REFoRA (1969).
52 Id. at 40-41.
53 ld. at 52. To accomplish this objective, the Committee recommends that the prospec-
tus be in narrative form. It should be capable of being read by investors generally and
not only by security analysts and other trained persons.
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For the first time a tax would be imposed on capital gains, but it would
be favored, only half of the gain being considered taxable income.5 4
The Government's proposals for tax reform must be viewed most
seriously. If implemented they will have direct effect on mutual fund in-
vestment behavior. In the context of capital gains treatment, one must
also read the "special rule" for mutual funds suggested by the White
Paper:55 A fund would be treated as a conduit for limited purposes only.
The White Paper stated:
This type of corporation [a fund] must be able to put its share-
holders in the same position as if they themselves had realized their
proportion of the capital gains of the mutual fund arising on the
sale of shares in public Canadian corporations. In the absence of
a special provision mutual fund shareholders would pay tax on
the full amount of such gains when they were distributed to them,
whereas tax should be applied only to half of the gain. Conse-
quently [a fund] would be enabled to make special distributions
to its shareholders which would be treated as though they were a
capital gain on the sale of a Canadian corporation. 6
The tax law presently imposes a quiet restraint on institutional in-
vestors in general, and funds in particular, to invest rather than trade and
to hold rather than sell. The tax law as it would operate if the White
Paper proposals are accepted would at one and the same time emphasize
and narrow the present course of conduct. Today it matters little
whether a fund enters transactions in the United States or in Canada, or
whether it buys widely or closely held shares. The future may find
significant tax incentives dangled before institutions to buy publicly
listed Canadian enterprises if only half the income coming from listed
Canadian capital transactions would be taxable. The conventional fund
would continue to have an advantage over a nonconventional fund en-
gaged in short sales or leverage.
The "buy Canadian" incentive could do much to institutionalize an
already thin Canadian auction market. For Canada, this means that the
relatively few financial institutions controlling most of their respective
industries, including the two mutual fund complexes that hold 50 per-
cent of all fund assets, will be encouraged to assume illiquid, locked-in,
control positions in publicly listed Canadian issues. Indeed, quite aside
from the White Paper, the larger funds have already shown a desire to
64M. It follows that only half of the loss from such transactions would be treated as
an ordinary loss.
65 Id. at 56.
rc Id.
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acquire 10 percent or more of outstanding Canadian stocks. Holding a
substantial block of a portfolio and being unable to liquidate its position
with ease, fund management may decide to reassess its function.
SECURITIES LEGISLATION: THE PROSPECTUS IN ONTARIO
Actual power to control fund investment behavior rests with the
Ontario Securities Commission, though the legal base for the exercise
of that power may be questioned. Presumably the Commission not only
might command detailed disclosure of fund investment policy, but also
might require that funds buy to hold and abstain from "in-out" trading.
Control over disclosure and investment behavior would be made possible
by the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction in approving a fund prospec-
tus.
Before dealing with actual Commission practice and fund compliance
with Commission order, the conceptual background of the prospectus in
Ontario and an explanation of the distinction between realistic power
and legal right must be given. The Kimber Committee, whose 1965
report to the Attorney General led to the 1966 Securities Act of Ontario,
cited with approval the approach taken by the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission. Since the purpose of the prospectus is to in-
form investors, the Committee felt that the information presented
should be clear, concise, and understandable. 57
In requiring that the prospectus provide "full, true and plain dis-
closure of all material facts relating to the issue to be sold," 58 the Securi-
ties Act of 1966 carried forward the implications of the Kimber Com-
mittee Report. Additionally, the prospectus must comply not only with
the Act, but also with regulations issued under it.59 Significantly, the
Director of the Commission was given discretion in the issuance of re-
ceipts for any filed prospectus.6 0 Thus, the statute suggests that even
though there is full disclosure, the Director may, in his discretion, with-
hold permission to conduct a public sale of securities.
57 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMm'I. ON SECURITiEs LEGISLATION IN ONTARIO, REPORT 40
(Mar. 11, 1965).
58 Securities Act, 1966, ON-r. STAT. c. 142, S 41 (1) (1966). Only the prospectus
requirements will be discussed in this article. There are, of course, other regular
reporting requirements which were generally applicable to funds in 1966, and in 1968
were tailored by the legislature to fit fund operations. See An Act to Amend The
Securities Act, 1966, ONT. STAT. c. 123, §§ 33-36 (1968). These reporting requirements,
however, do not constitute an attempt by government to regulate investment behavior.
59 Securities Act, 1966, ONT. STAT. c. 142 § 41(2) (1966).
60 Id. S 61(1). In part, the purpose of this section seems to be to deny discretion to
the Director in issuing a receipt where the prospectus fails to meet certain listed
requirements.
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If the general prospectus provisions are applied to the mutual fund
industry, there is the potential for immediate impact on investment be-
havior. Funds are intimately tied to the Securities Act of 1966; they
are continually redeeming existing shares, selling new shares, and en-
gaging in an ongoing public offering. 61 Under the Securities Act, the
potential control which the Commission could exercise over the fund
industry is enormous. In terms of disclosure alone, the Commission
could require an in depth statement of fund investment policy. In its
regulations, the Commission has sought to achieve this end.62 A special
form was devised for funds,6 3 with five of 26 items listed in the form
bearing directly on investment policy.64 Others touch upon the problem
somewhat less direcdy;65 under the heading "Fundamental Policies of the
Issuer," a fund must declare its position as to certain enumerated mat-
ters. These include: (1) issuance of securities other than those offered;
(2) concentration of investments in a particular class or kind of indus-
try; (3) underwriting of securities of other issuers; (4) purchase and
sale of real estate; (5) purchase and sale of commodities or commodity
future contracts; and (6) the making of loans, secured or unsecured.
61 It is, of course, possible for a fund to reject Commission regulation by simply
discontinuing the sale of fund shares. This did occur in 1968-1969. In essence, an
open-ended fund became closed-ended. See MtrrurA. FuND CommTm REPoRT, supra
note 1, at 19.
6 2 Securities Act, 1966, ONT. STAT. c. 142 § 61(1) (a)-(e) sets the legislative context
for the regulations. Under section 61 (1) (a) (i-iii) the Director may direct the Registrar
to issue a receipt unless "the prospectus or any document required to be filed therewith
(i) fails to comply in any substantial respect with any of the requirements of this
Part or the regulations, (ii) contains any statement, promise, estimate or forecast that is
misleading, false or deceptive, (iii) conceals or omits to state any material facts
necessary in order to make any statement contained therein not misleading in the light
of the circumstances in which it is made .... "
63Under the Securities Act Regulations, 1967, § 12, 2 CCH CAN. SEc. L. REP.
51-741, the prospectus of a fund must comport with the requirements of Form 12,
2 CCH CAN. SEc. L. REP. 51-983. In this regard, the power of the Director to
enlarge upon the definition of mutual funds cannot be ignored. The regulations
specifically state: "'mutual fund company' means a company designated by the
Director as a mutual fund company." § 8(h), 2 CCH CAN. SEC. L. REP. 51-737. This
power, however, could not override legislation which exempts certain industries from
the Act itself.
04These are item 6 (Fundamental Policies of the Issuer); item 7 (Policies with
Respect to Security Investments); item 8 (Diversification of Assets); item 9 (Tax Status
of Issuer); item 10 (Tax Status of Security Holder). 2 CCH CAN. SEm. L. RIE.
51-983, at 9931-10-11.
G5 Item 15 dealing with the funds dividend record; item 16, identifying the directors
and officers; item 19, stating functions of issuer and distribution of securities; and,
finally, item 1, relating to redemption rights. Id., 51-983, at 9931-9, 9931-12-13.
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As a final subitem, the Commission asks for a statement of "any other
policy which the issuer deems fundamental." 66
The Commission also requires a description of six matters which
might not be considered by a fund to be fundamental. These matters
are:
(a) the type of securities (for example, bonds, preferred shares,
common shares) in which it may invest, indicating the pro-
portion of the assets which may be invested in each type of
security;
(b) the percentage of assets which it may invest in the securities
of any one company;
(c) the percentage of securities of any one company which it
may acquire;
(d) investment in securities of companies for the purpose of exer-
cising control or management;
(e) investment in securities of investment companies or other mu-
tual fund companies; and
(f) any other investment policy not specified.., which is set out
in the issuer's letters patent, other constating documents, by-
laws, articles or regulations. 67
Should a fund hold five percent of any company's issue, regardless
of class, the Commission demands tabulation in the prospectus. The
fund must give the name of the company, its principal business, the
percentage of securities directly or indirectly held by the fund, and the
percentage of fund assets at book value invested in the particular com-
pany."8 Finally, a fund must state the general basis upon which the in-
come and capital receipts of the issuer are taxed 69 and the income tax
consequences to fund shareholders, with specific reference to distribu-
dons whether they be in the form of dividends or otherwise.
Through this burdensome array of items to be disclosed, the Commis-
sion derives substantial control over fund investment behavior. The
statements must be both truthful and in complete harmony, and if such
harmony does not exist the Commission can ask for clarification'7 Since
there have been no rulings by the Commission, there is no indication to
66 Id. item 6(a)-(h), 51-983, at 9931-10.
67 Id. item 7(a)-(b).
68 Id. item 8, 51-983, at 9931-11.
09 Id. items 9-10.
70 See UNrrw AccumuLAvE FuND LTD., PROSPECTUS, Dec. 15, 1967, at 4. "No security
will be purchased unless in the opinion of management a reasonably good market exists
for its resale .... "
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the public of agency concern over capacity to achieve fund investment
policy. This is not to say, however, that the agency is unaware of the
problem in other areas. "The Commission has ... refused to accept a
prospectus for filing where the indicated resources were insufficient to
accomplish the objects indicated in the prospectus." '71 Moreover,
through its power over the prospectus, the Commission has claimed the
right to regulate fund management fees and other expenses,72 even when
such fees and expenses have been fully disclosed. The Commission has
taken the view that the Securities Act meaning is clear: the agency
may accept or reject a prospectus. The statutory terms are open-ended.
Thus, so long as the agency imposes conditions on fund operations and
treats them equally as a class, there is nothing to stop substantive regu-
lation through control over the prospectus.
The Commission might have weighed the experience of the Board of
Trade in England before embarking on substantive regulation. Acting
on a statutory grant similar to that given the Ontario Securities Com-
mission, the Board of Trade refused to grant an order authorizing a
unit trust on the ground that its initial service charge was excessive. 73
The statute itself seemed to call only for disclosure of fees;74 however,
another proviso added these key words: "that the scheme [prospectus]
is such as to secure that any trust created in pursuance of the scheme is
expressed in a deed providing, to the satisfaction of the Board, for the
matters specified in the Schedule to this Act." 71 On appeal, the Chan-
cery Division allowed the Board itself the use of discretion, thus acknowl-
edging its power to regulate "on the true construction of the Act." 71
The words of the statute were clear; it was not a matter for the court to
question. The court did not stop there, however; it found a still broader
ground for the use of Board discretion. Justice Danckwerts wrote:
It seems to me that there is much to be said for the argument
71 See J. WILLAmSON, SuPPLEMENT To SEcuRmTIs REGULATION IN CANADA 60 (1966).
72 Policy Statement of Ontario Securities Commission, Feb. 1968, 2 CCH CAN. SEc.
L. REP. 54-914; Policy Statement of the Commission of the Ratio of Management
Fees and Other Expenses to Net Assets, Jan. 1969, 2 CCH CAN. SEc. L. REP. 54-930.
73 Allied Investors Trusts, Ltd. v. Board of Trade, [1956] 1 All E.R. 162 (ch. 1955).
74 The relevant statutes as given by the court were the Prevention of Fraud (Invest-
ments) Act, 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6, c. 16, § 16(1) (c) schedule, as amended Companies Act,
1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 47, § 117(1). The schedule in question called for information
"[flor determining the manner in which the manager's prices for units on a sale and
purchase respectively and the yield therefrom are to be respectively calculated and for
entitling the holder of any units to require the manager to purchase them at a price
calculated accordingly." [1956] 1 All E.R. at 166.
75 [1956] 1 All E.R. at 167.
76 Id.
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that the Board of Trade have this general discretion [to refuse to
authorize unit trust schemes] and under the terms of the Act are
not bound to make an order merely because the matters stated
in the schedule are duly contained in some form or other in the
deed submitted to them.... I should be inclined to come to the
conclusion that the Board of Trade had such discretion . . ." 7'
The court did not consider the intent of the legislature in construing
the statute. The language of the Act seemed plain. So, too, the language
of the Securities Act of 1966 seems clear. Yet, none can doubt the intent
of the legislature as it relates to the prospectus, for, in this regard, the
Kimber Committee Report"8 was without ambiguity. A prospectus is
designed only for the purpose of full disclosure of relevant data. Never-
theless, the Ontario Securities Commission continues to use its power
over the prospectus as a means of substantive regulation. There has been
no formal appeal by the funds either to the agency or to the courts.
The mutual fund industry is placed in the difficult position of having
legal rights which cannot be pursued. Any appeal from the Commission
takes a long time to process and the funds are bound by law while the
appeal is pending and cannot sell shares in the absence of a prospectus.
Thus, even after winning on such an appeal, the fund still loses. A court
will pass only upon the issue and prospectus presented to it; the fund
would be compelled, even after a court judgment, to draft a new
prospectus reflecting the changes in the facts taking place while the ap-
peal was pending. With the new prospectus, the entire process could
begin again.
Both the Commission and the funds exist in a shadow world because
of the discretion which the Commission has assumed. The Commission
exercises the power to regulate the funds, but whether that power
could withstand judicial attack is still unclear. The funds are handling
an ever shifting base of other people's money and cannot afford to risk
Commission displeasure. Good business judgment may dictate that the
funds respond to agency questions only to the extent necessary, that they
adopt the agency's terms of reference even if they bear slight resem-
blance to the existing state of business life, and that they make no effort
to provide the public with an in-depth detailed statement of investment
policy beyond that which the law requires.
Since there are few fixed guidelines either to the exercise of Commis-
sion discretion or to fund investment behavior, any variance in a prospec-
'7 Id. at 169.
78 THE AttoRNFY GENERAi's COMm. ON SEcuiu-as LEGISLATION IN ONTARIo, REPORT,
(Mar. 11, 1965); see note 57 supra and accompanying text.
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tus from a bland norm may invite rejection by the Commission. Instead
of being a vehicle for full disclosure, the prospectus may become an
invitation to Commission regulation without recourse. The Commission
may be both aware of its potential power and reluctant to require
greater disclosure since such a requirement would compel the Commis-
sion to regulate in areas which are presently beyond its concern.
The typical Canadian fund prospectus contains no firm, positive state-
ment of investment policy and often no statement of any kind relating
to capital gains treatment either for the fund or its shareholders ° Where
a fund ventures precision, it invites criticism. For example, a fund which
states in its prospectus that "[n]o security will be purchased unless in
the opinion of management a reasonably good market exists for its re-
sale . .. " 80 and which has 14.35 percent of its assets tied up in several
stocks of which it holds five percent or more8' is inviting inquiry by the
79 T-m UmlrT_ AcumurxA-rvW FUND LTD., PRospEcr-s, (Dec. 15, 1967), provides a
typical example of a statement relating to tax status. Indeed, United's statement is some-
what more expansive than most funds. See, e.g., UNrran AMEICAN FUND LTD., PRos-
Pxcrus, 5 (Aug. 18, 1967). United Accumulative's answer to Form 12 is:
(f) Tax Status of Shareholders
Individual shareholders are subject to income tax on dividends paid by
the Fund and either received by them in cash or reinvested in additional
shares of the Fund on their behalf. Individual shareholders resident in
Canada are entitled to a tax credit equal to 20% of the net dividend so
received. Shareholders who are taxable Canadian corporations will not be
subject to corporation taxes on any dividends paid by the Fund.
(g) Tax Status of the Fund
The Fund operates in such a way that it qualifies as an investment com-
pany under the provisions of the Income Tax Act. The Fund pays federal
and provincial income taxes at rates totalling 23% of net income from
dividends on foreign securities and interest. If it did not qualify as an
investment company the Fund would pay tax as a normal Canadian
company, calculated at rates totalling 23% of taxable income up to
$35,000 and 52% of the balance of taxable income. In either case dividends
received from most Canadian companies are exempt from income tax.
The wholly-owned subsidiaries each of which holds securities of companies
outside of Canada representing not more than 10% of the consolidated
assets of the Fund, do nor qualify as investment companies. Each such
subsidiary is established as a Canadian company to provide a means of
paying tax at the normal corporate rates provided by the Income Tax Act
on earnings from their investments, without changing the 23% tax rate
currently applicable to the earnings of the Fund which qualifies as an
investment company.
There have been a few funds, however, which touch the question of capital gains,
albeit briefly. See, e.g., FuND SPEc, PRosPEc-us 7 (Apr. 25, 1967) ("The Fund expects
to conduct its investment activities in such a manner so that capital gains realized on
the sale of securities will not be subject to either Canadian taxes or United States
capital gains tax under present legislation.")80 See notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text.
81Id.
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Commission as to how the fund could liquidate these securities with rela-
tive ease and where the resale market exists. In asking these questions,
the agency would be concerning itself with the narrow matter of share
liquidity; the fund stated that its shares had ready liquidity, and this was
a dubious statement. The fund would reply that it invested in issues
which hopefully would rise in value, with the result that they could
be resold at a later point. Generally, there is no need to sell such issues
unless they become a bad investment; at that point, any holding re-
gardless of size might lack liquidity.82 Furthermore, there is usually no
need to sell holdings to pay the redeeming shareholders, since the funds
have been able to meet such demands out of new share sales and most
funds reserve the right to pay redeeming shareholders in their propor-
tional interest of the underlying shares.83
The combination of ambiguous law, ambiguous agency policy, and
fund restraint results in an innocuous prospectus statement of investment
policy. In their study sponsored by the Canadian Mutual Funds Asso-
ciation, Quirin and Waters argued for more detailed public disclosure
of investment policy. The beneficiaries would be the public-the con-
sumers of fund shares-and the funds themselves. Specifically, they
placed significant emphasis on investment objectives,84 managerial skills,85
and financial disclosure of past performance as a means for testing the
"pedigree" of the fund,86 namely the capability of its management.
Quirin and Waters reasoned that the investment objectives of the fund
explain many of the apparent differences in realized returns and risk
and can be useful as an initial screening device. If the investment policies
of the fund in fact are compatible with its stated objectives, the investor
will generally be able to select a fund in a particular risk-return range.87
To aid in shaping a more precise investment policy, Professors Quirin
82 The questions relating to liquidity will be dealt with in the second argument of
our treatment of mutual funds. At this point it is only necessary to state that generally
there always is a market for a listed issue. The more significant problem, however, is the
price at which one must sell in order to attract a buyer.
88 Umrr AccUmU.AmsVE LTD. Phospxarus, supra, note 70, at 15.
Payment by the Fund for such shares so surrendered shall be made by
cheque payable to the registered owner thereof except that, if, in the opinion
of the board of directors, which shall be conclusive, conditions exist which
make payment wholly in cash unwise or undesirable, the Company may
make payment wholly or partly in securities or other property the value
of which shall be determined as of the time the value of the shares is
determined.84 Paper 9, supra note 24, at 94.
85 Id. at 9-4, -5.
86 Id. at 9-4.
87 Id.
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and Waters have followed the same approach as the Ontario Securities
Commission in the particularization of subject matter. Two of the points
made in this study, which was sponsored by the fund industry, are ob-
jectives which by inference the industry itself could achieve in principle.
The first point is that investors have a right to know the fund's trading
philosophy, specifically whether the fund intends to accomplish its
goals through buying and holding or through active trading.18 The
second point is that the investor should be furnished with a statement
identifying and describing the qualifications of those who are involved
in investment decisions and any material changes that occur.89 Insofar
as this latter point is concerned, there seems no reason why funds could
not institutionalize and state the process of investment decision making.
The majority of funds have externalized investment management ren-
dered under contract to them. As a condition to the contract, the in-
vestment advisor could be required to describe its own line of organiza-
tion with respect to investment decisions; the fund could do the same."0
Desirable as they may be, the Quirin-Waters' proposals may not be
accepted by the Ontario Securities Commission until that agency first
defines its own role in the regulation of mutual funds. Until rules are
established, the funds cannot be expected to subject themselves to in-
vestment inhibition through greater disclosure, and the Commission, to
date, has given no indication of demanding anything more than the
bland statements already included in a fund prospectus. Thus, the law
of disclosure has not affected funds in their investment behavior in the
equity market."' The law has made more difficult, however, any under-
88 Id.
89 id. at 9-5.
90 See generally D. BAUM & N. STILES, THE SILENT PARTNERS: INSTITUTIONAL INVESrORS
& CORPORATE CONTROL (1965).
A single trust department, charged with administering a large number of
accounts and frequently vested with wide discretionary powers, may find it
difficult to remain entirely faithful to all of them. Within the framework of
national [United States] banking regulations, efforts are made to achieve this
end. Responsibility for the proper exercise of fiduciary duties is placed
squarely and exclusively with a bank's board of directors. Regular audits are
required. Moreover the quality and nature of investments made are the
proper subject of examination by the Comptroller.
Id. at 114.
9 1 MuTuAL FuND CoMMrTE REPORT, supra note 1, at 408-09.
[R]egulatory attention has tended to focus on the statement of investment
practices rather than on the statement of investment objectives. . . . The
difficulty is that no attempt has been made to link investment practices with
investment objectives. Similar restrictions on investment practices are
imposed by administrators on all mutual funds. Regardless of their
investment objectives, portfolio managers are anxious to be subject to as
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standing of fund investment policy. The law has not been used to bring
forth those facts which are both necessary and relevant to investment
analysis.
Strenuous efforts were made by the all-government committee on
mutual funds to make disclosure a real function of public protection. A
subcommittee named by the group, consisting of a former securities ad-
ministrator, a mutual funds officer, and two lawyers, unanimously rec-
ommended the preparation and dissemination of a readable summary
prospectus at an early stage in the fund sales process. The summary
would include those portions of the full prospectus which are of greatest
importance to purchasers. Its format and content would be discussed
between the securities administrator and the mutual fund organization 2
and could differ considerably between different funds. Periodic reports
would be coupled with the summary and the prospectus itself. The
securities administrator would be in a position to compel disclosure that
not only would be useful to the public exercising their judgment as con-
sumers, but also to the agency staff.
The fact remains that in Ontario prospectus conditions for mutual
funds have not changed materially. Neither new legislation nor new
regulations have been introduced; it must be emphasized that they are
not likely to be proposed until the Ontario Securities Commission,
through its Director and staff, believe change is warranted. There is no
few limitations as possible on investment practices. As a result, virtually
all mutual funds, regardless of their investment objectives, have statements
of investment practices which are as liberal as the administrators will permit.
This is the reason why the latter statements do not differ significantly
among most mutual funds, and it also accounts for the paradox noted above:
the differences among the vague statements of investment objectives are
more meaningful than those among the precise statements of investment
practices. It is also important that the former indicate what the mutual
fund will do; the latter only indicate certain things that it will not do.
92 MUUAL FuND CoMmi=_E REPoRT, supra note 1, at 535. To encourage a concise
readable summary, the Committee Report further recommended that for inaccurate
or false statements the statutory civil penalties applicable to the full prospectus should
not attach. The Report provided an illustration of a summary by a hypothetical
nonconventional fund:
It is important for you to realize that the Fund takes risks in the pursuit
of maximum capital gains on a long-term basis; among the risks it assumes
are those involved in investments in small companies without established
earnings records. The fund is known as a nonconventional fund because it
is permitted to, and often does, borrow money to invest. All of these
practices may increase the degree of risk; while the acceptance of risk
may improve gains made by the Fund, it may also result in losses. You
should not invest in this mutual fund with money you cannot afford to lose.
Id. at 536.
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other governmental body, and no Parliamentary professional staff, suf-
ficiently skilled to evaluate the fund industry.93
THE LAWS OF INCORPORATION: FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL
Law sets the structure within which mutual funds must operate;
however, that structure has had only a minimal effect on investment
behavior. The form that a fund takes, whether trust or corporation,
relates to investment behavior only in the areas of taxation and share or
unit redemption. There are certain advantages to the trust. When a
mutual fund is organized as a trust, income is taxed to the beneficiaries
whether or not they actually receive any distributions. The 20 percent
dividend tax credit is available to them on their share of the net dividends
received by the fund from taxable Canadian corporations, and depletion
allowances are passed through in much the same way. As a result, for
tax purposes the trust is simply a conduit.
An incorporated mutual fund qualifying as an "investment company"
may elect to be taxed either as an ordinary corporation or as an "invest-
ment company." An "investment company"7 pays a tax of 21 percent
on taxable income which does not include capital gains and dividends
from taxable Canadian corporations. The shareholder is entitled to a
20 percent tax credit on dividends he receives, so that the overall treat-
ment is rather close to the treatment of an unincorporated mutual fund
and its members. The Canadian Mutual Funds Association has argued
that the tax position of incorporated mutual funds is inequitable, and that
they should be treated as trusts. The Association has pointed out that
the tax paid by incorporated funds is borne by all shareholders, regard-
less of their ability to use the dividend tax credit; a shareholder who
cannot make use of the tax credit is better off, insofar as taxes are con-
cerned, in an unincorporated mutual fund than in an incorporated one."'
In the past, funds have been able to redeem shares out of cash flow
coming from the sale of new shares in the fund;95 there has been no
93The Report of the Mutual Funds Committee noted administrative opposition to
some key proposals, including the establishment of nonconventional funds. To this the
report seems to call not only for legislation, but perhaps equally important, curtailment
of agency discretion. "A scheme such as we . .. recommend could not be applied by
securities administrators exercising their discretionary power on a case-by-case basis;
this is only one example of the difficulties in the existing method of control." Id. at 21.
94 J. WILLA MsON, supra note 71, at 409.
05Professors Quirin and Waters in their general discussion of liquidity are pointed
in discussing problems flowing from redemption demand: "Neither sales nor redemptions
of a fund's own shares can be forecast with precision .... Actual cash requirements
for a given future day are never precisely known, and a fund must keep precautionary
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need to liquidate underlying investments to meet demand.9 A fund must
be able to plan for the future and cannot operate, either in theory or in
fact, on the assumption that major demands for redemptions can always
be met immediately with cash outlays. Protective measures against a
major onslaught of demand, however, do not arise solely out of vague
fear coupled with conservative behaviorY7
If other institutions acquired substantial holdings in a fund, the de-
mand by one or more of them could easily exhaust cash reserves and
force partial liquidation of underlying portfolio investment.98 It is also
true that where a fund is highly leveraged-fund assets are divided among
relatively few issues-liquidation of any one issue in a downward market
could reduce the demand for new shares, at the same time increasing
the rate of redemption. 9
balances against the possibility that cash needs may turn out to be greater than
expected." Paper 13: Liquidity and Fund Operations, in QUIMN & WATERs, A STUDY
OF THE CANADIAN MUTUAL FUmNs INDUsTRY 13-4 (1969).
9 6 Our concern, it must be emphasized, is the impact of institutional investors on the
Canadian equity market. The income which has been mentioned relates to dividends
and interest. It does not cover capital gains which are not taxed as income. It should
be noted, however, that even in terms of dividends and interest the Carter Commission
would eliminate the distinction between the trust and corporate form. "Where a trust
has issued transferable or redeemable units, each of which carries a specific undivided
interest in the trust property and the trust income, the trust should be taxed in the
same manner as a corporation." CARTER CoM 'N REPoRT, supra note 28, at 194.
97This results in the funds assessing the costs of having cash or securities that are
readily marketable. Id.
98 In 1966, the Securities and Exchange Commission referred to" the Ontario incor-
porated Fund of Funds Ltd. which had assets of $420 million and had substantial
holdings in U.S. mutual funds ranging from .6 percent to 100 percent of the funds'
outstanding issue. The SEC stated: "[Flund holding companies.., pose a real potential
for the exercise of undue influence or control over the activities of portfolio funds.
The basis of this threat is the possibility of large-scale redemptions inherent in the
ownership of large blocks of mutual fund shares by a fund holding company." H.R.
REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 315 (1966) (hereinafter cited as SEC STUDY);
see Mru. FUND Commvrrrm REPoRT, supra note 1, at 444-45: "A substantial holding
by one mutual fund in another mutual fund exposes the latter to the possibility of a
redemption which might force a liquidation of portfolio securities, and would reduce
total net assets and management fees. The power to effect such a redemption might
be used by the management company of the fund or funds to exert influence over the
policies of the underlying mutual funds." Id. As a result the Committee did not recom-
mend against the abolition of the fund on funds but rather that it "should not be
permitted to acquire shares or units of another mutual fund if, after such acquisition,
the fund on funds, alone or together with other funds on funds under common
management, would hold in excess of three percent of the outstanding shares or units
of that mutual fund. This percentage limit corresponds to that contained in section
12(d) (1) of the [U.S.] Investment Company Act of 1940, and we think it appropriate
for adoption in Canada." Id.
99 Consider the fund that is highly leveraged and invests substantial sums in "letter
stock" which often is unseasoned and, in any event, is in a primary distribution.
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In Canada, funds have been permitted to exercise individual discre-
tion00 in establishing rules for redemption. The Ontario Securities Com-
mission asks only for disclosure of redemption policy and a detailed
statement covering valuation.101 Those funds created as trusts may
write into the chartering trust instrument whatever suits their purpose.
The Trustee Act of Ontario which would otherwise govern investments
under a trust 02 is inoperative. 103
Of the 117 Canadian mutual funds in existence at the end of 1968,
62 were organized as companies and held the greater share of industry
assets.10 4 Here the law reaches the matter of fund redemption indirectly
by dictating when a corporation may redeem its own shares. This ap-
proach is designed primarily to protect creditors of the corporation and,
generally, to discourage the corporation from trading in its own shares.1°'0
Professors Quirin and Waters note that such a purchase "does have certain implications
for the marketability of the fund's portfolio and . . . believe that, where securities
subject to restricted marketability are part of a portfolio, full disclosure of this
feature should be made:' Paper 12: Trade Association and Related Restrictions on Fund
Investment Policy, in QUmN & WATERS, A SrTUY OF THE CANADIAN MUTUAL FUNDS
INusmy 12-8 (1969).
100 In the absence of national securities regulation, an event not likely for many years,
the Committee Report recommends that this discretion be left to the fund management
when (a) the disposal by the mutual fund of securities owned by it is not reasonably
practicable, or (b) a valuation of the assets of the fund is not reasonably practicable.
MUTUAL FtN Cozxumrim REPORT 504.
'OlSee Ontario Securities Act Regulations, Form 12, Item 1, 2 CCH CAN. Src.
L. REP. 51-983.
102 Id. § 26-32. Section 26 sets the tone for itemization: "A trustee may invest any
trust money in his hands in the classes of securities mentioned in this section, but only
if the investment is in other respects reasonable and proper ... ." Id. § 26.
103 Id. § 67. See also Trust Companies Act of Canada, CAN. REv. STAT. c. 272,
§§ 64(2), 66(3), 66(5) (1952). Section 64(2) states: "The company may manage, sell.
or dispose of investments as the terms of the trust pursuant to which they were made
require or, in the absence of such requirement, as the directors, subject to the provisions
of this Act, may see fit." Id. § 64(2). In many respects the trust deed provides less
opportunity for unit holder information and control than that afforded to the
shareholder of an incorporated fund.
Because the trust agreement and the declaration of trust are subject to
minimal legal restrictions governing their content, the mutual fund or-
ganizers have very great flexibility available in the decision as to what
the relevant provisions should be. Few of these agreements and declara-
tions give any voting rights to unit holders . . . . Its more important
provisions are outlined in the prospectus, but that may not be available
either. Finally, the fact that many of these documents are subject to
amendment without prior consent of the unit holder may decrease the
value of disclosure even where full disclosure is made.
MTAr. FUN Comz =rrr REPORT 25-26.
0 4 MrruAL FUND CoMMIrTn:r REPORT 22.
105 J. WLuLTmsoN,, supra note 71, at 407-08.
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Until recently, except for purposes of disclosure, 06 Ontario dealt
with a fund as with any other corporation; under its Corporation
Act only preferred or special shares could be redeemed. Thus, a
fund created as a corporation in Ontario must provide for two classes
of shares, common and special, and both must be set out in its letters
patent.07 The Act requires that there be a separate fund and, to satisfy
redemption demands, that the price paid reflect the actual value of the
shares. In the same letters or supplementary letters patent, the corpora-
tion must formalize its procedure for valuation of special, or fund, shares.
Nothing in the Act prohibits a fund from attaching redemption con-
ditions applicable to all special shareholders or from suspending or modi-
fying the right of redemption upon the happening of stated events; rather
the Act allows the individual formulation of redemption rules. The
thrust of the Act is not wholly relevant to the fund industry, though
the same statute firmly binds those members seeking provincial in-
corporation.10 8 Perhaps for that reason or perhaps as a response to
federal legislation, changes were made in 1970 that will allow mutual
fund shares to be redeemed in the manner and according to the condi-
tions set out in the fund's articles of incorporation. 09
In some respects, the Canada Corporations Act seems more in tune
with fund reality. It specifically permits a classification called mutual
fund shares. Such shares have the quality of "requiring the company
issuing to accept, at the demand of the holder ...and at prices de-
termined and payable in accordance with the conditions, the surrender of
the shares ... that are fully paid." 10 It is still for the fund, 'however, to
delineate the conditions under which shares would be redeemed."' The
law does not so much change existing conditions for federally incor-
porated funds as it clarifies industry practice. Before 1965, federal
funds were incorporated in much the same manner as those in On-
100 Special provision has been made for fund reporting. They largely duplicate that
which the Ontario Securities Act in its 1968 amendments requires. See Corporations
Amendment Act, 1968, ONT. STAT. c. 19, § 6 (1968).
107The Corporations Act, ONT. REv. STAT. c. 71 § 27(3) (1960) allows a fund to
redeem its own preferred shares. Section 27(6) provides for such redemption out of a
fund set aside for that purpose at a price reflecting the market value.
108 Once the preference, which can be minimal, has been established the fund may
eliminate voting rights. The shares, after all, are not common, but special. To the
extent that a fund operates with complete freedom from shareholder restraint it obtains
greater flexibility in investment decision.
109 Business Corporations Act, 1970, BiaL No. 61, 3d SEss., 28th LEG. § 37 (Ont. 1970).
The bill was introduced by the government.
11OCanada Corporations Act, CAN. STAT. c. 52, § 12(A)(1) (1965), amending,
Companies Act, CAN. REv. STAT. c. 53 (1952).
ll Canada Corporations Act, CAN. STAT. c. 52, § 12(A) (2) (1965).
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tario, through the use of special shares. Illustrative of the lack of change
are the relatively few funds already incorporated federally which filed
supplementary letters patent two years after the Canada Corporations
Act had been amended to cover mutual fund shares. By 1967, only six
of the 24 funds which were federally incorporated before 1965 had
sought reclassification 1 12 while each of the eight funds incorporated
after 1965 made use of the proviso for mutual fund shares.
There may be some added meaning in the failure of so many pre-
1965 federal funds to modify their letters patent. These funds continue
to restrict redemptions to monies available through reserves and capital
surplus. The 1965 amendment would allow them to redeem out of
capital at net asset value. For many funds, this opportunity has been
rejected by implication. The funds retain the flexibility to restrict re-
demptions, and the Canada Corporations Act is as permissive as the legis-
lation in Ontario.
The question remains whether the funds should retain this absolute
right of control over redemption policy. An agency such as the On-
tario Securities Commission could regulate on the same basis as it has
laid down management fee scales; it is not clear, however, whether any
legal basis for such regulation exists.
In the United States, the Investment Company Act of 1940 took a
firm view on the matter of redemptions, and no registered investment
company was given the right to suspend redemptions. The statute de-
fined the situations in which redemptions could be suspended: (1) if
the New York Stock Exchange is closed for reasons other than cus-
tomary weekend and holiday closings; (2) if trading on the New York
Stock Exchange is restricted by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion; (3) if disposal of a fund's securities is not reasonably practicable;
(4) if emergencies impede a fund from fairly determining the value of
its assets; and (5) if the SEC permits such suspension for the protection
of the securities holders of the fund.
In its 1966 report on the Public Policy Implications of Investment
Company Growth, the SEC did not seek to broaden its powers in the
matter of fund redemptions," 3 despite the growing institutionalization
of the stock market; 14 however, the law had imposed an obligation on
the funds to redeem and agency discretion in permitting exception to
112Those funds which changed their shares to "mutual fund shares" were: American
Growth Fund, Ltd.; Dominion Equity Investments Ltd.; Executive International
Investors Ltd.; Grouped Income Shares Ltd.; Regent Fund Ltd.; and Savings and
Investment Corporation Fund Ltd.
113 SEC STUDY, supra note 98, at 300.
114 Id.
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that rule was severely limited. The Commission was not to act as a
market regulator. Apart from limited, emergency powers, the Com-
mission did not have the responsibility for controlling price fluctuations
in the securities markets. 5
In Canada, the legal reality of fund redemption policy stands in a
radically different posture than in the United States. For the Canadian
fund manager, that policy has built-in flexibility. Individual rules can be
set that will permit the fund to pursue investment goals without the
threat of a run and a corresponding need to liquidate holdings at a sub-
stantial loss; the absence of law leaves each fund free to shape varying
approaches to redemption. This apparent freedom, however, is some-
what limited by the certain reaction of the investing public if any fund
were to use its legal right to restrict redemptions.
These realities not only were recognized by the Canadian all-govern-
ment Committee report; they were also met with meaningful analysis
and recommendations. Illustrative is the report's view of a fund as a
long-term investment. Short-term traders were to be penalized in making
any redemption demand.
We have concluded that any purchaser of shares or units to a
value in excess of $50,000 should be subject to a penalty, payable
to the mutual fund by reduction of the redemption price, of 4%
of his redemption price if he redeems his shares or units within
90 days, and of 2% of his redemption price if he redeems his shares
or units within six months." 6
115 Id. Recently, and significantly, the SEC permitted Mates Investment Fund, Inc. of
New York City to suspend the right of redemption because a "substantial portion of
the funds portfolio" was held in lettered stock of Omega Equities, Inc. which had been
the object of a 10-day trading suspension order by the Commission. Omega, an over-
the-counter stock, jumped from 60-70 cents a share on April 30, 1968, to $33-35 by
December 9, 1968. On June 12, 1969, two months after Omega trading once again
was permitted, the SEC lifted its suspension of redemption in Mates' fund shares.
On July 17, 1969, Omega filed a registration for a public offering. SEC File No.
2-33896. Following the SEC order sales and redemptions of shares resumed on
July 23, 1969, for the Mates Investment Fund, Inc. A "cool it" attitude apparently
characterized investors in the Fund at that time. According to the Fund, holders
asked for redemptions of about $1 million worth of the approximately $8.5 million
portfolio, or about 11.3 percent.
A shareholders meeting on Monday, July 21, 1969, approved the following resolutions:
a new advisory agreement with management; selection of accountants ratified; reim-
bursement of the Mates Management Company for $165,000 expenses; increased number
of authorized shares fourfold (from $5 million to $20 million). A spokesman for the
Fund characterized the shareholders as showing an "amazing lack of antagonism."
N.Y. Times, July 23, 1969, at 56, col. 7.
116 MTrTUAL FUND COMMrrE RFPoar, supra note 1, at 492. The report agreed to the
payment of redemption with underlying securities, if the shareholder agreed. In the
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SUMMARY: THELAW AND MUTUAL FUNDS
Canadian law permits the mutual fund industry great latitude to
invest in the equity market as individual business interests dictate. In
areas such as taxation, freedom has come through nonenforcement of
statute. In other areas, fund behavior has been left unstructured because
of agency ambivalence; note, for example, the Ontario Securities Com-
mission's timid attempt to regulate through control over the prospectus.
Finally, there are instances where the law has permitted the industry to
pattern its own standards. The Canada Corporations Act takes this ap-
proach in the area of redemptions.
Whatever may be the limitations and purposes of the law regarding
mutual funds in Canada, the industry itself has acted to form rules of
conduct binding on its members. These rules not only are law, in the
sense of binding announced standards of conduct; they also provide
considerable insight into how the individual members of the industry
enact their role. Moreover, they provide insight into how the industry
thinks it should function.
PROFILE IN ACTION
A CONTEXT FOR SELF-REGULATION
Industry self-regulation takes place in a specific context: restraint will
not be self-imposed unless it serves the individual member's own ends
as well as those of his industry. To the extent that the restraint con-
flicts with the profit motive, it is possible that the prohibition will be
ignored or circumvented. Thus, in order to evaluate the breadth and
effectiveness of fund self-regulation, it is necessary to understand fund
motivation, which is a function of the fund's structure, and the relation-
ship between this motivation and investment in the equity market. A
fund must enhance the market value of its portfolio or risk the danger of
decreased sales of fund shares coupled with increased demand for re-
demptions which could cause a fund to liquidate portions of its hold-
ings.117 Thus, fund motivation is predicated upon performance and
absence of such agreement the report recommended approval be obtained from the
relevant securities administrator. Id. at 497-500.
117 Professors Quirin and Waters recognized the problem. They wrote: "The danger
is simply that, if a fund were faced with a severe market slump and a run of
redemptions, it might not be able to sell shares and reduce indebtedness quickly enough
to have anything left for the last few shareholders." They added, however, "[W]e
regard these dangers as remote . . . and the use of moderate leverage as virtually
harmless, especially in view of the fact that investor risk is probably greater in certain
unlevered funds than in other levered ones." Paper 12, supra note 99, at 12-3.
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liquidity. Indeed, it is possible for a fund bent on performance to erode
its position of liquidity.
A conflict between these two goals arises through the means used to
measure performance. Specifically, performance is based upon valuation
of fund shares. If a fund share cost $10 last week and can be redeemed
for $40 today, the fund is "performing." A shareholder cares little about
*hat that $40 represents; from his point of view, $10 wisely invested
has brought $40. There is difficulty, however, in measuring performance
and in accepting the method for valuing underlying shares.
Money for the redemption of shares is generally provided by cash
flow and not by the liquidation of investment. The valuation of a fund's
underlying investment and, hence, the value of each fund share, which is
determinative of fund performance, is calculated on a day-to-day basis
upon the stock market quotation. 118 The larger funds may invest be-
tween $1.5 and $3 million in any given issue," 9 and investment of this
sort cannot be liquidated easily; however, since redemptions are made
from funds received for newly purchased shares, this lack of liquid-
ity will not deleteriously affect the fund's ability to redeem its shares
so long as the fund continues to attract new investors by performing
well. Problems may arise, however; for example, if the fund takes a
long-term position, or even a short-term loss with a view-toward a long-
term gain, fund performance, essentially a day-to-day phenomenon, may
decline with a resultant decrease in cash flow through sales and an in-
crease in redemption demands.
The "speculative" fund is a recent innovation, 120 meeting the needs
of those with growing incomes who want to maintain their worth in an
inflationary economy. The speculative funds, five of which are repre-
sented in the Canadian Mutual Funds Association (CMFA), have been
highly successful in attracting the savings dollar, even though they have
only a small part of the industry's assets. As a result of performance
ranging up to an annual increase in value of 100 percent, they are making
a sizeable and increasing proportion of the industry's new fund sales.
In 1968, speculative funds had net sales of $105.2 million; in the same
1 8 Difficulties, of course, are encountered by those funds which have purchased
"letter stock," that is, shares coming from a primary distribution of what may be an
unseasoned company. How should such an issue be valued? If acquisition cost is used,
the issue may be substantially undervalued. If market value is used, the issue may be
overvalued since it remains illiquid. Professors Quirin and Waters feel such an issue
"should reflect a percentage discount from the prevailing market price not less than
the discount at which [it was] acquired." Id. at 12-9.
119 Paper 13, supra note 95, at 13-3.
12 0 Paper 2: Competition in the Canadian Mutual Funds Industry, in QUIRIN &
WATERS, A STUDy OF THE CANADIAN MuTUAL FUNDs IiNusmvY 2-26 (1969).
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year, all other CMFA members' net sales totalled only $102.3 million.121
These figures at least raise the questions of whether the fund investor
is aware of the increased risk and whether the larger funds will respond
to the increased competition and in what manner.
A possible indication of industry concern came in the form of an
address by Mr. R. H. Jones, Vice President, Securities Investment
Division, The Investors Group, on April 21, 1969. An officer of Canada's
largest fund complex, Mr. Jones noted that speculative funds repre-
sented a departure from traditional investment philosophy by empha-
sizing short-term over long-term gain. Mr. Jones also expressed concern
with a definition of fund performance which is based on out-performing
competing funds; although not defective from a conceptual viewpoint,
this definition can lead to the sort of setbacks that a fund manager
must avoid and could result in increased regulation of the fund industry
in order to curb speculative excesses.12
The emphasis on short-term comparativ.e performance-an emphasis
necessary for the survival of a speculative fund-does represent a de-
parture from a philosophy of investment which pre-dates the speculative
fund and which permitted a fund to accept temporary setbacks in order
to buy value which would eventually bring satisfactory investment
return. Despite this change in investment philosophy, however, neither
Mr. Jones, nor the Chairman of the Ontario Securities Commission, nor
the President of the Toronto Stock Exchange saw any need to check
the growth of the speculative fund. The Chairman of the Ontario
Securities Commission felt that the only need was for more frequent
fund reporting.123 The President of the Toronto Stock Exchange recog-
nized that because of their size some funds could bring pressure to bear
on selected issues, but he felt that this simply reflected supply and de-
mand and saw no effort being made to create pools of money for the
purpose of market manipulation, similar to those established in the
1211d.
122Address by R. H. Jones, Vice President, Securities Investment Division, The
Investors Group, before the Winnipeg Rotary, April 21, 1969. See also MUrUAL FUtM
CoarrrnE RPoaRT, supra note 1, at 62-63.
1
=
3 Chairman H. E. Langford said:
Institutions are the largest single factor in the stock market and recent
activity in the Canadian market is due to fund transactions. There is
growing concentration in Canadian issues recently. The greater activity of
U.S. funds and institutions in more speculative issues can be seen in increased
portfolio turnover. We are giving thought to the question of whether more
frequent reporting of fund portfolios might not be in the public interest.
The Globe & Mail, Sept. 5, 1968, § B, at 5, col. 1.
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1920's. Indeed, the Exchange President saw institutions generally as a
stabilizing influence on the market.124
The approach of the speculative funds stands in conceptual contra-
diction to the formal policies of the Canadian Mutual Funds Association
relating to investment restrictions. At their root, CMFA policies attempt
to strike a balance in favor of safety through the vehicle of investment
diversification. For the speculative funds, some of which are not mem-
bers of the CMFA, such restraints can inhibit performance. Thus, com-
petitive pressure can be exerted to ease rather than tighten existing regu-
lation. Professors Quirin and Waters argued for upward, more liberal
regulations in their 1969 report,125 even though 1968 CMFA amend-
ments already had eased investment restrictions.
New competitive pressures have an effect on the nature and effective-
ness of self-regulation. The CMFA is an association with no statutory
base and exists at the desire of members of the industry and not because
of government fiat. As an association, it has the power to fine, censure,
suspend, or expel a member,126 such powers being exercised on occasion.
In one instance, the CMFA's executive director, acting immediately and
without seeking executive committee approval, warned a fund that it
had exceeded the allowable limit of investment in a single company.
Within a few weeks, the matter was corrected. Through consultations
with the CMFA's Executive Committee, the same fund was cautioned to
avoid possible conflicts of interest through purchase of short-term paper
from an institution controlled by a fund insider.127
The CMFA can shape enforceable rules of conduct. In terms of
investment restrictions, however, unless the goals to be achieved are
reasonably clear and unless there is a public policy formalized through
law, loose and changing interpretations can be expected as a response to
competitive presures. The problem, therefore, is to delineate or
categorize the questions that each fund and the Association must answer
324 Id. at col. 4.
125 Paper 12, supra note 99, at 12-7.
226 These sanctions apply, inter alia, for the violation of any Canadian Mutual Fund
Association regulation. Complaint may be made by any Canadian Mutual Fund
Association member or any person. If the Canadian Mutual Fund Association Executive
Committee finds grounds for probable cause, after appropriate notice, a hearing -will
be held and explanation requested from the charged member. On a finding of guilt,
opportunity for appeal to the full Canadian Mutual Fund Association Board of
Directors is allowed before sanctions may be imposed. The nature of that appeal is
one in which the Board has before it "all relevant correspondence" together with the
Executive Committee's recommendation. Again, explanation by the charged member is
permitted. CMFA By-Laws No. 13-Business Conduct, as anended (May 17, 1966).
127 Interview with Michael Bell, Executive Director, CMFA.
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in formulating meaningful criteria for investment restriction. In doing
this, the limitations of the CMFA must be stressed. For one, it is not
fully representative of the industry. On December 31, 1968 its mem-
bership consisted of only 41 of the 136 mutual funds qualified for sale in
Canada and of only 14 of the 92 management companies associated with
such funds. Yet, though representing a minority of funds, CMFA mem-
bers controlled 86 percent of industry assets. 128 The Canadian Com-
mittee on Mutual Funds noted that the members of the CMFA "have
certain common characteristics. Every mutual fund which belongs to
it is sold subject to a basic sales charge in excess of 8%. Most of these
mutual funds are distributed primarily or exclusively through direct
sales forces .... ,, 129 The CMFA's recommendations may be considered
by provincial securities commissions; nevertheless, the CMFA may not
represent the entrepreneurial motivations of smaller and newer mutual
funds.
CMFA'S INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS
On their face, the CMFA's investment restrictions are fairly inflexible
regulations. They require that every fund disclose its investment restric-
tions in its prospectus,' a point obviously covered by Ontario's prospec-
tus requirements. There are absolute prohibitions upon the purchase of
warrants' 31 and the purchase of securities of its management company,
underwriter or contractual distributor.132 There also are restrictions on
margin buying, selling short,'33 and borrowing money. 1 4 The mortgag-
ing or pledging of assets in excess of 10 percent of net fund value at
market is also prohibited.135
More interesting, perhaps, are the detailed provisions relating to equity
investment. Before 1968, member funds were forbidden from using more
than 10 percent of fund assets in the purchase of any security except
obligations guaranteed by either the Canadian or United States govern-
12 8 MuTUAL FUND Commrr=_ RPoRT, supra note 1, at 727.
129 Id. at 728. The committee further noted that "[no mutual fund organized outside
Canada belongs to the CMFA. Until early in 1969, its membership consisted entirely
of Canadian-organized mutual funds, their management, and distribution companies.
Early in 1969, one independent sales force was admitted to membership."
130 CMFA Regulations, Rule 5 (Apr. 1964).
13 1 Id. Rule 5 (a).
182 Id. Rule 5 (d).
133 Id. Rule 5 (b).
134Id. Rule 5(a). "Every mutual fund ... shall not borrow money for any purpose
nor mortgage nor pledge any of its assets to an amount in excess of 10% of its assets
at market."
135 Id.
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ments, and no fund could own more than 10 percent of any portfolio
company's outstanding issue.'3 6 In May 1968, the rule was revised to
allow funds to acquire more than 10 percent of a portfolio company's
outstanding issue if certain conditions were met. Two principal condi-
tions were: (1) the fund's total investment in the portfolio company
could not exceed five percent of the fund's net assets137 and (2) the
fund in no event could acquire more than 10 percent of a portfolio com-
pany's outstanding voting stock.3 8
The revised rule has significant meaning for large funds seeking
Canadian investment outlets. A large fund may stay within the five
percent asset limitation and still obtain 10 percent of a desired corpora-
tion's outstanding voting stock, in addition to significant holdings in
the same corporation's nonvoting stock; moreover, if the listed stock is
nonvoting in the first instance, a fund may exceed the 10 percent limi-
tation so long as no more than five percent of assets are employed. Thus,
the new rule permits the large fund to maintain certain economies of
scale by limiting the number of its investments, thereby providing more
effective portfolio management. As a general rule, larger Canadian funds
have minimum investment guidelines which statistically indicate that
they expend $1.5 to $3 million in any given security.3 9 At present, this
dollar expenditure usually results in individual investments equal to about
one percent of fund assets.
A brief survey of fund industry structure underscores the significance
and need for encouragement of increased equity purchasing. In assessing
institutional impact on the equity market, the existence of giant entities
cannot be ignored. Using data obtained from the Financial Post Survey
of Investment Funds, 1961-1968, Professors Quirin and Waters com-
puted the dollar assets of the eight largest management companies to be
$2,135 million, compared to over-all industry assets of $2,716 million.
Of these eight, the largest management company had $915 million by the
end of 1967 and the two largest companies had $1,316 million." 0
In 1968, it became fairly obvious that the funds were not tied to the
Canadian equity market. Whenever they found it to their advantage,
they could and did invest in the United States. By December 31, 1962,
CMFA funds had invested $144.1 million in United States and foreign
assets. By December 31, 1967, that figure had risen to $1,008 million,141
136 Id. Rule 5 (c), as amended (May 1968).
13d. Rule 5(f (ii).
188 ld. Rule 5 (f) (ill).
139 Paper 13, supra note 95, at 13-3.
140 Paper 2, supra note 120, at 2-9.
141 Id. at 14-3.
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nearly half of total industry assets, yet no fund held five percent or more
of any United States portfolio issue. This fact gives some clue to the
motivation behind Canadian fund foreign investment. At the end of 1967,
United Accumulative Fund Limited, one of the two largest funds in
Canada, had 8.3 percent of its assets invested in International Business
Machines, however, this was less than one-tenth of one percent of
IBM's outstanding stock. United enjoyed at least potential benefits from
its investment: it was able to place significant sums in an industry that
had not yet fully developed in Canada and it had secondary liquidity in
that investment,142 due to the relatively free turnover of IBM stock.
Putting aside issues concerning national politics and dollar-drain, the
funds have the opportunity to invest in what amounts to a North
American market and this helps to explain the import of the broadened
CMFA investment rule. Canadian funds are not compelled by economic
considerations to buy Canadian equities. Due to the extent of which
nonCanadian investment alternatives are available, the inference may be
drawn that the larger funds sought a broadened rule to take advantage
of what they considered good investment opportunities which happened
to be Canadian. If the CMFA rule had remained the same, the funds
would have pursued other investments and would not have been com-
pelled to invest in questionable Canadian issues. Before the 1968 CMFA
revision, the pursuit of other investments brought member funds very
close to the maximum investment permitted, both in terms of percentage
of outstanding portfolio issue and in terms of percentage of fund assets
placed in a particular issue.
142 Some 64 percent of present holdings of U.S. stocks by Canadian funds are
accounted for by domestic funds, the remainder by specialty funds; the former accounted
for 65 per cent of all purchases over 1962-67 and for 64 per cent of purchases during
1967. Unlike the holdings of the specialty funds, holdings of U.S. securities by
domestic funds represent the consequences of decisions taken by portfolio managers.
Informal discussions with some portfolio managers suggest that there are at least two
reasons for holding U.S. securities, both of which could account for a deliberate shift
into such securities by a growing fund:
(1) the greater liquidity offered by U.S. security markets;
(2) opportunities offered by the U.S. market for investment in industries
which are not available in the Canadian market, but which have
characteristics making them a desirable addition to a portfolio.
A third possible reason-not mentioned in any of the discussions-but which would
seem equally valid, is to take a position in U.S. dollar assets in order to provide a hedge
against possible devaluation of the Canadian dollar relative to the U.S. dollar. Such
a hedge is provided by any holding of U.S. securities. However, a better one is provided
by holdings of shares in Canadian companies whose sales are made in the U.S. at U.S.
prices but whose expenses are incurred in Canada at Canadian prices. The pulp and
paper and certain base metal industries are examples. Paper 14, supra note 40, at 14-11.
143 See Appendix.
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The tables show that often an expenditure of less than one percent
of fund assets enables the larger Canadian groups to acquire gross posi-
tions of 20 percent or more in portfolio holdings. Markborough Proper-
ties, Ltd. provides a case in point. With .5 percent of its assets, United
Accumulative obtained 6.9 percent of Markborough's outstanding com-
mon, and with .1 percent of fund assets, warrants to purchase 20.8
percent of Markborough's common. With only .9 percent of fund as-
sets, Investors Growth Fund purchased 31 percent of F.P.E. Pioneer
Electric's Class A shares.
On these facts, it is clear that a relatively small expenditure of total
assets by the larger Canadian funds may result in major positions in
issues of companies with a small equity base. It follows that smaller
Canadian funds have comparable potential. For example, Canadian Gas
and Energy Fund Ltd., which ranked below the eight largest Canadian
funds in 1967,'14 used 8.9 percent of its assets to acquire 3.8 percent of
Home Oil Company's Series B stock.
SIGNIFICANCE OF FUND HOLDINGS: LIQUIDITY AND MOBILITY
When a portfolio company is on the rise, there are obvious advantages
which inure to the heavily committed fund insofar as it shares propor-
tionately to its holdings in the company's good fortune and may tend
through its heavy share holdings to stabilize price; morever, a fund's
performance is measured by the market value of its holdings and to the
extent portfolio share price goes up, fund management can expect
greater sales and the investment advisor will receive a greater return.
Regardless of the difficulty in unloading heavy share positions, most
funds need not fear a rash of redemption demands, even in a falling
market. Historically, fund sales have exceeded redemptions. This fact
is illustrated by monthly figures over a two-year period for Irivestors
Growth and United Accumulative.
SALES AND REDEMPTION OF FUND SHARES*
INVESTORS GROWTH FUND DOLLAR AMOUNTS
OF CANADA LTD. THOUSANDS
Month and Year Sold (5) Redeemed Cs)
1966
January 3,366 735
February 4,446 777
144 Paper 2, supra note 120, at 2-13.
* Source: Canadian Committee on Mutual Funds and Investment Contracts.
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INVESTORS GROWTH FUND
OF CANADA LTD.
Month and Year
1966
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
DOLLAR AMOUNTS
THOUSANDS
Sold ($)
3,799
2,427
4,872
3,633
2,968
6,182
6,456
2,158
3,288
2,253
1967
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
3,213
4,703
2,805
3,028
4,517
3,751
3,762
9,523
7,849
3,958
6,762
4,557
Redeemed (5)
838
638
926
807
594
575
891
1,004
715
673
1,029
1,231
1,516
1,490
2,015
2,053
1,393
1,364
1,784
2,013
2,349
2,057
SALES AND REDEMPTIONS OF FUND SHARES
UNITED ACCUMULATIVE
FUND LTD.
Month and Year
1966
January
February
DOLLAR AMOUNTS
THOUSANDS
Sold ()
8,961
9,194
Redeemed ($)
1,042
1,121
Source: Canadian Committee on Mutual Funds and Investment Contracts.
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UNITED ACCUMULATIVE
FUND LTD.
Month and Year
1966
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
1967
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
DOLLAR AMouNTs
THOUSANDS
Sold ($)
13,497
7,258
10,582
6,499
5,479
6,620
8,430
5,067
6,248
3,900
4,721
4,577
7,259
4,056
5,129
5,260
5,048
6,591
8,589
5,231
6,938
4,837
Redeemed ($)
1,177
1,497
1,356
1,750
1,468
1,947
1,197
1,591
1,413
1,744
2,595
3,461
3,921
4,570
5,010
5,161
3,052
3,248
3,341
3,839
3,632
3,968
Should a fund find itself in need of additional monies to take advantage
of current investment opportunities, there is that resource which Profes-
sors Quirin and Waters have called secondary liquidity, which frequent-
ly consists of American issues such as IBM. 4 1 Furthermore, a fund can
borrow against its assets to a limited extent.146 If there is a problem of
liquidity or mobility, it is not apt to be found in general fund perform-
ance so much as in the particular portfolio holding. As of December
145 Paper 13, supra note 95, at 13-2.
146 Paper 12, supra note 99, at 12-3.
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31, 1967, no'Canadian fund had followed a policy of investing most
fund assets to acquire concentrated positions. Without exception, only
the larger fund complexes took five percent or more of any Canadian
issue and, these larger funds, Investors Growth and United Accumu-
lative, maintained a balance in terms of share sales and secondary liquid-
ity.
In this context the statistics are inconclusive as to the consequences of
individual share concentration. A random summary of the volume of
trading in relation to outstanding shares in some of those issues where
funds have concentrated holdings produces a broad range of figures.
Using 1967 as the sample year, Union Oil Company of Canada Ltd.
with 4,785,000 outstanding shares had only 139,557 shares traded, ac-
counting for 2.9 percent of the total. One of the smaller Canadian funds,
Natural Resources Growth Fund Ltd., using 9.71 percent of assets,
held .42 percent of Union's outstanding common at the end of 1967.
Though limited in percentage of holding, this rather small fund cer-
tainly had a potential to influence the price of Union common. If it
so desired, it could have accounted for nearly 20 percent of trading.
Next, consider Markborough Properties Ltd. with outstanding shares of
3,647,094 and 1967 year-end trading of 316,479, or 8.7 percent of the
total. In the same period, two funds held 16 percent of Markborough's
outstanding common, or twice the 1967 trading volume. Finally, at year-
end 1967 one fund with .8 percent of its assets held 7.6 percent of
Steinbergs Class A, the only issue traded. In the same year with 3,715,639
shares outstanding, Steinbergs had traded 201,747 shares, or 3.4 percent
of the total.
Where a fund finds itself with heavy holdings in a company whose
issue it no longer desires, the price of selling out might be very high
indeed. It is even possible to argue that in a falling market where the
issue is thin-where there is a small equity base-buyers simply may not
be available for large blocks of stock. Whatever the arguments may be,
however, fund statistics for 1962-1967 provide few examples of locked-
in situations. The best example is Steinbergs where in 1964 two fund
complexes, consisting of three funds, held 20.33 percent of the com-
pany's Class A stock; this was an investment in the retail food industry
which institutions found a few years later, due to the intensity of com-
petition, to have had a blunting effect on profit.
Steinbergs was incorporated in Quebec in 1930. In 1958, Steinbergs
had made a public offering of a nonvoting issue, which enabled the
raising of capital without the dilution of control. The issue was fully
subscribed. By the end of 1964, the mutual funds held 20.33 percent and
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accounted for 26.89 percent of the trading in Steinbergs stock. By 1965
the funds had increased their position in Steinbergs to 23.8 percent.
There was little change in 1966 when the funds maintained their posi-
tion at 23.50 percent; however, in 1967 the funds sold a substantial
portion of their holdings and at the end of 1967 their holdings were
reduced to 14.58 percent, fund trading having accounted for over 20
percent of the total trading in the stock.
The 1967 reduction in Steinbergs holdings by the funds amounted to
40 percent. Profits had increased from 1963 to 1966, and earnings per
share had risen from $.80 in 1963 to $.89 in 1964, $1.05 in 1965, and
$1.11 in 1966.147 In 1967, profits remained at $1.11.141 By 1968, Stein-
bergs finally reacted to the squeeze of competition by establishing dis-
count food operations and by diversifying through the operation in
Quebec of four experimental drive-in restaurants.149 Unwilling to risk
a turbulent future, some of the funds were able to sell out at a loss.
Another fund eliminated only a portion of its holdings at a profit.
At one point a few funds had held 20.33 percent of Steinbergs' non-
voting issue; however, they were not locked in and in one year were
able to cut their holdings by 40 percent. Steinbergs was not a failing
company but was reacting to the profit squeeze. Statistics offer no il-
lustration of simultaneous fund liquidation of fund holdings in a com-
pany whose fortunes are clearly falling. This may attest to the prudent
investment judgment of the fund; however, it remains an unanswered
question as to what would have happened if the three funds investing in
Steinbergs simultaneously had opted out. The "in-out" performance
fund was not a significant force in Canada in 1967, and each of the three
funds had long-term investment objectives.
SIGNIFICANCE OF FUND HOLDINGS: PORTFOLIO CONTROL
Although Steinbergs Class A is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange,
it is nonvoting. Indeed, for all practical purposes it must be considered
nonvoting common since the preference which it has is negligible. The
lack of a vote, however, did not deter the funds from buying Stein-
bergs. Similarly, the fact that other issues are also nonvoting "common"
has not inhibited purchase by the funds. Examining the two largest
fund complexes in Canada, one finds significant sums allocated to such
issues. At the end of 1967, United Accumulative had $27,976,596, or
147 Financial Corporate Service. "Steinbergs Five Year Quick Reference Summary,"
March 4, 1968.
1481d.
149 Financial Post, Sept. 28, 1968, at 24, col. 2.
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7.8 percent of its total investment portfolio, placed in nonvoting com-
mon. The monies were placed in nine issues. United's position in these
stocks rose from an initial expenditure in 1962 of $1,284,375 to a figure
27 times greater in 1967. At the end of 1967, Investors Mutual had
nonvoting common valued at $17,621,808, or 3.1 percent of its total
investment portfolio. This reflected a rise of more than four times the
1962 figure of $4,614,282. By 1967, Investors' holdings had been re-
duced to five nonvoting issues.
The extent of these holdings indicates, to some extent, the degree
to which desire for control of portfolio companies influences fund in-
vestment. Responding to detailed questioning by the Canadian Com-
mittee on Mutual Funds and Investment Contracts, not a single fund
indicated an interest in investing for control.1 0 No fund indicated a
desire to substitute its business judgment for that of portfolio manage-
ment as a matter of policy. If the policies of a portfolio company are
contrary to what the management company believes necessary, the
security will be sold. Almost without exception, the funds refuse to
acknowledge a need to vote their holdings; proxies either are returned
in favor of management proposals or they are not voted, the funds
ultimately relying on the market for recourse.
In making investments, funds necessarily consider portfolio manage-
ment. A company would not normally become a portfolio company
unless fund management was prepared to vote with the management of
the company. When this is no longer true, the fund sells its shares in
the company.'5' Yet, many funds acknowledged that life with port-
folio companies is not simply a question of selling or holding. There
is often dissatisfaction with the policy or actions of the management of
these companies, but it is weighed against those areas in which there is
satisfaction.
From the answers submitted by the funds, it became clear that the
availability of a market and the possibility of sale was sufficient to insure
discussion and even negotiation between portfolio and fund manage-
150The questions asked the mutual funds concerning portfolio relations by the
Canadian Committee on Mutual Funds and Investment Contracts concerned the fol-
lowing areas: holdings in portfolio companies; policy concerning officers', directors' and
employees' activities in portfolio companies; participation in organization of portfolio
company; participation in portfolio company financing or mergers; participation in
portfolio company operations; attendance at annual and special meetings of portfolio
companies; use of proxies; action when dissatisfied with portfolio company policy;
joint action to influence portfolio companies.
151The same fund added, however: "Of course a situation could arise in which the
sale of a security was impossible or difficult, and in which a change of directorship
would be desirable from a standpoint of fund shareholders."
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ments. From the fund that said it lived with dissatisfaction came the
admission that in 30 percent of the instances when it became dissatis-
fied there was an attempt to influence management change. In the
remaining 70 percent, the fund liquidated its holdings. Seldom did the
fund use its vote or attend annual meetings. The lack of fund attendance
is hardly surprising, however, in light of the scant opportunity at
these gatherings for fruitful discussion of company prospects at a so-
phisticated level.' 52
Fund influence upon the management of portfolio companies is often
brought about not by the possession by the fund of a large block of
votes, but, rather, through the market effect implicit in the disposition
by the fund of a large quantity of the company's stock. This is especial-
ly true, for instance, when the stock that the fund holds is nonvoting
and the quantity held makes easy liquidation impossible. In most in-
stances, the influence that the fund exerts in this manner is through the
company's fiscal agents or through analysts who have a close relation-
ship to the company's management.
Funds are institutions which are designed to provide an increased
flow of funds into the equity market and, insofar as influence on manage-
ment is concerned, they should be distinguished from the occasional
investor. Their influence on management of the public corporation
transcends particular fund holdings. Funds will have a continued im-
pact on the market, and the larger the fund, the greater the impact.
Moreover, the larger funds, having more monies in each portfolio
company than the smaller funds, find a greater need not only to initiate
discussion but also to respond to portfolio problems of a given type. Ac-
cordingly, four out of the eight largest Canadian funds reported in-
stances in which efforts were made to influence portfolio management.
The four represented more than half of the industry's assets; however,
52 of 58 reporting funds indicated no instance of such an attempt
being made.'
A pattern of action has emerged where influence has been exerted.
The larger funds, however, do not want to run the day-to-day opera-
152 The fund continued: "However, exceptions are made, especially where unusual
developments appear possible, or where the company offers a particularly good oppor-
tunity for the analyst to meet executives informally at greater length after the
meeting .... There has been no change in the management company's policy since
1962."
153The 52 stated that they had neither volunteered nor been consulted during
the period surveyed by the Canadian Committee on Mutual Funds and Investment
Contracts (1962-67) regarding dividend policy or any other aspect of portfolio com-
pany management.
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tions of a portfolio company.154 Part of their decision to buy an issue
rests in their confidence in management. Thus the funds use influence
only to protect their investment. From the answers received, a summary
categorization has been prepared that delineates areas of fund concern.
The first of these areas is portfolio company financing and mergers.
Funds have frequently been consulted by portfolio companies concern-
ing a proposed offering,'55 and quite often their recommendations have
been accepted. One of the larger funds kept records which noted six
instances between 1964 and 1967 when advice was given relating either
to the financing of new issues or to the terms of a merger affecting a
company in which the fund held stock. In five of the examples listed
by the fund, inquiries were initiated by the company considering the
public offering. In each of the five company-initiated efforts, the fund
made recommendations which were accepted and, with a limited ex-
penditure of monies, acquired major positions once the questioned issue
was made public.
Funds with large holdings have an important stake in merger activi-
ties. They are interested in the merger being favorable both in terms
of the new enterprise to be formed as well as the formula for any ex-
change of stock. Canadian funds have not only consulted portfolio
management as to modification of some merger conditions, but on oc-
casion they also have helped to organize opposition to the merger itself.
Together with a U.S. institution, two of Canada's largest funds sought
154 An example of stock liquidation by a large fund given to the Canadian Committee
on Mutual Funds was:
More recently (1968) we disposed of part of our holding of [XYZ, a U.S.
company] because of a growing concern as to the competence of manage-
ment which has been indirectly relayed to the [fund] through third parties.
This company appears to have lost complete control of costs in the final
quarter of its fiscal year, having stated publicly in a press release that
they anticipated "good year for earnings" three weeks after the fiscal
year end only to contradict themselves a few weeks later with the publica-
tion of poor results indeed. In this instance, we intend to support any
move by another corporation to acquire [XYZI and thereby recoup part
of the capital loss sustained as a result of managements apparent incompe-
tence.
155 This is a well established function for the management companies of funds and
fund companies. They play the role of investment bankers. Not infrequently they hold
positions of long-term relationship with the portfolio company. See United States v.
Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (SD.N.Y. 1953). In Morgan, the United States alleged that
the 17 defendants had conspired to monopolize the securities business in violation of
the Sherman Act §§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964). The court held that the evidence
was insufficient to establish that the 17 investment banking firms had used the syndicate
system of underwriting and distributing securities as a conspiratorial device in con-
nection with an integrated over-all combination in violation of the antitrust laws.
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to block a merger between two giant U.S. corporations. They were
unsuccessful in part because another fund elected to settle for cash for
its 10 percent position, receiving a greater cash amount than any other
institutional investor was able to obtain from the acquiring corporation.
A second area of concern is the accounting practices by portfolio
corporations upon which funds must be able to rely. The failure to fol-
low accepted procedures could distort the profit picture. An example
of fund action in this area occurred in 1965 when a fund advised one of
its portfolio companies to change to a nationally known auditing firm.
A third area of concern is the portfolio company's dividend policy;
however, fund action has been taken only when the company's policy
has caused the fund concrete policy problems, and the consensus among
the funds is that their views carry only minimal weight in this area. One
large fund reported that since January 1, 1966 the only instance of in-
fluence being exerted on the dividend policy of a portfolio company
occurred when a dividend date, which normally fell at the end of the
year, fell early in 1968. This caused embarrassment since fund ac-
counting uses ex-dividend dates to bring in fund income, and the income
from that dividend was helping to maintain investment company status
for calendar year 1967.
A fourth area of concern to the mutual funds is the selection of port-
folio company directors and officers, although during the period 1962-
1967 funds seldom sought directorships and rarely exerted influence
upon the company through possession of large blocks of votes. How-
ever, fund officials, particularly in the larger enterprises, were asked to
be directors or to suggest candidates. One fund reported three ex-
amples of requests for suggestions by Toronto Stock Exchange listed
corporations, and in each instance where its advice had been sought it
had been accepted.
One frequently cited reason for seeking advice from the funds is their
financial expertise. For example, a private company, considering a
public distribution at a formative stage in its corporate existence, came
to the X Fund and asked X's management for advice and to nominate
one of its key people to the corporation's board. The fund was interested
in the corporation, but it recognized the risk-taking venture of the
company and the fact that a public market had yet to be established. The
fund placed a member of its management on the board, and later took
a major position in the public issue of the corporation; thus, the fund
had an interest in the continuing success of the company. It endeavored
to insure not only a proper scheme" of financing, but also management
continuity and corporate concentration in those areas of greatest profit-
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ability. Fund directors are also sought by companies with seasoned
securities.
Among certain funds, there is concern over naming directors to other
corporations since embarrassment might result if a decision were made
to sell the portfolio issue. One of Canada's largest funds, however, re-
ported that it had nominated one of its managing directors to the boards
of a number of other corporations, subsequently selling its holdings in
each, and its nominee had remained a director of each corporation.
Responding in 1968 to information requested for 1962-1967, a smaller
fund briefly stated that occasionally one of its directors or those of its
management company had become a director of a portfolio company.
In each instance, the reason for this had been to provide the fund access
to information about the progress of the company's business, thus bene-
fitting both the portfolio company and the fund's shareholders; further-
more, there is no specific written code of ethics with reference to this
sort of situation even though there is no distinction between the interests
of the fund and its management company. One of the larger funds,
however, did foresee a potential conflict of interest and had developed
a policy concerning outside directorships which recognized that a desig-
nated group within the fund complex made investment decisions and
forbade anyone in that group from holding an outside directorship.
Others, however, were encouraged to accept appointments because it
provided access to the people in a company with operating information,
though not necessarily inside information.
Whether current developments in Canada and the United States will
result in development by the funds of a more rigid policy concerning
outside directorships is still unclear. In October 1968, a leading Phila-
delphia banking house, Butcher & Sherrerd, resigned the 36 director-
ships it held in publicly owned companies. W. W. Keen Butcher, the
firm's managing partner, said that this policy had been established be-
cause of a series of events in the business world which had tended to
change attitudes concerning the role of investment bankers and stock
brokers who serve on the boards of publicly owned companies. Al-
though the presence of an investment banker on a board of directors
results in important benefits to the company and all its stockholders,
Butcher & Sherrerd relinquished all of its directorships in order to
eliminate any possible conflict of interests.'
156 The Globe & Mail, Oct. 2, 1968, § B, at 2, col. 3: "The managements of most
corporations and securities firms have been re-examining their policies ever since the
Texas Gulf and Merrill Lynch cases became prominent. The action taken . . . is
believed to be the most drastic taken in response."
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The Canadian funds, as well as other institutional investors, presently
are faced with a conflict of interest problem that must be considered.
On September 30, 1968, the Toronto Stock Exchange amended its
Corporate Guide To The Timely Disclosure Policy. The thrust of
this policy is to compel disclosure by listed companies of facts- which
can reasonably be expected to affect materially the value of the listed
securities. The Toronto Stock Exchange has stated:
When there is a situation where information is required to be
kept confidential for corporate reasons management should watch
closely the market activity in its securities. Unusual market activity
in terms of price or volume is the best indication of whether con-
fidentiality has not been maintained. If such activity occurs 'the
Exchange requires that an announcement be made clarifying the
situation.157
The fund with a director on a portfolio board might be placed in an
awkward position if, through independent observation, it became aware
of impending change and yet felt constricted in its freedom to trade
in the portfolio company's securities. If the fund were to trade in the
company's securities, the volume of trading might affect materially the
issue price, and under its policy statement the Toronto Stock Exchange
might temporarily suspend trading in the issue. 5 s The fund or other
institutional investor at a minimum should be careful in the information
it elicits from its officers sitting as directors of portfolio companies. 59"
157 ToaoNro Srocx ExcHANGE, CoRpoRATE Gurir To Tan TIMELY DiscLoStaPum CY,
Sept. 30, 1968, at 2.
158 Id. at 3.
On some occasions unusual market activity is caused by the existence of
rumors .... [A] clarifying statement is expected when the market activity
indicates trading is being influenced by rumor. The most effective .. .
is a prompt clarification or denial by a corporate release.
The Exchange may halt or suspend trading in the shares of a company.
Trading is halted pending the making of a corporate announcement and
to allow for the dissemination of that announcement.... [W]hen
the market activity discloses that important news is available to some traders
but not to the public at large .... [Tihe public should have the oppor-
tunity to base their investment decisions to buy or sell listed shares on the-
best information available.
159 Using substantially the same criteria as the Ontario Securities Commission, the TSE
seeks disclosure and reporting by insiders. 1 CCII CAN. SEC. L. REP. 3630. In'
cluded in the definition of insiders are any director of the company; any senior officer
(president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary); and any beneficial owner of 10 percent
of the outstanding voting securities of the company. (Aside from tax consideration,
this proviso might help to explain the 10 percent limitation on voting securities imposed
by the CMFA.) I
The Commission's function under the Ontario Securities Act, 1966, c. 142, ONT. STrkT.,
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The fund behavioral pattern is directed toward investment protection
and not the substitution of fund management for that of the portfolio
company. Funds respond as investors, not controllers; they respond
in terms of their own management capacity. Fund shareholders derive
the distinct benefit of a unified fund management not fragmented by
conflicts of interest. The shareholders of the portfolio corporation
derive the benefit of a sophisticated check on management by the funds.
In the thinking of the SEC both in 1940 and in 1966, there was a public
policy use for the power of investment companies.10
Investment companies may serve the useful role of representatives of
the great number of inarticulate and ineffective individual investors in
industrial corporations in which investment companies are also interested.
Throughout the course of the existence of such industrial corporations,
various problems are presented to their stockholders which require a
degree of knowledge of financial and management practices not pos-
sessed by the average stockholder. Investment companies by virtue of
their research facilities and specialized personnel are not only in a posi-
tion to adequately appraise these situations but also have the financial
means to make their support or opposition effective. These investment
companies can perform the function of sophisticated investors, disasso-
ciated from the management of their portfolio companies. They can
appraise the activities of the management critically and expertly, and in
that manner not only serve their own interests but the interests of the
other public stockholders.16' Direct efforts have been made in Canada
to maintain the distinction between investment and control and, in
light of demonstrated fund behavior, the fund industry understands
and accepts this distinction. To some extent, the earlier discussed regu-
lations of the Canadian Mutual Funds Association focus upon it. On
as amended, c. 123 (1968) in part is to define more clearly insiders and their responsi-
bilities under the Act by means of regulations. Under the terms of the Act not only
may the Commission act to command reports, but, just as important, those reports
are given to the public. Id. § 110(1); see 2 CCH CAN. SEc. L. REP. %51-160 at 9833.
Finally, there rests with the corporation and any person a right of action against an
insider who violates the disclosure requirements in connection with a capital securities
transaction of the corporation that, "if generally known, might reasonably be expected to
affect materially the value of such securities." The liability is to compensate for direct
loss flowing from the transaction; moreover, the corporation may recover through
accounting any benefit the insider received. (This assumes the information was not
generally available.) Ontario Securities Act, 1966, ONT. STAT., c. 123, § 113 (1968);
see 2 CCH CAr. SEC. L. REP. 51-168, at 9834.
110 See H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 310 (1966).
161 Id.
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their face, the regulations established by the fund industry itself impose
limitations on the amount of voting stock of an issuer that may be ac-
quired.
The lines drawn by the Canadian Mutual Funds Association have a
certain clarity to commend them. Percentages of assets and issues can be
measured with reasonable precision and without undue difficulty. The
industry need not waste inordinate time in policing a law of absolutes;
moreover, the percentages bespeak a policy that can be comprehended,
although effective control of a large, publicly held corporation in fact
can be gained with 10 percent of the voting stock.
Even though the funds do not want control over portfolio companies,
their extraordinary growth coupled with investment in a decreasing
number of issues can only increase their power to influence portfolio
management. Funds have not been passive shareholders. They under-
stand and use the power of their position, but this power has been
directed not toward control so much as toward the protection of an
investment. Despite their locked-in position in many selected issues,
funds are market-oriented; they do not view their role as producers of
goods. The power that the fund exerts must be viewed in the context
of the market; it influences portfolio management not through the vote
but through the threat of partial or total liquidation of an investment
and the withdrawal of confidence which could destroy the prospect of
any new equity issue or even private placement of bonds.
Laws should be passed which do not restrict funds in exercising
sound business judgment as to the kind and quality of investment which
will yield the best return. Nevertheless, it is a proper function of the
law to allow the fund shareholder to know what he is buying and to
insure that the fund conforms to a stated investment policy. The regu-
lations of the Canadian Mutual Funds Association provide an adequate
starting point for constructive proposals. The regulations reject the
ambiguous, ill-defined concept of diversified-pnd which is used in the
United States. Rather, the Canadian Mutual Funds Association seems
to say that for an entity to be a fund no more than a certain percentage
of assets may be invested in a certain percentage of voting securities;
it is not how a fund is labelled, but what it does with its monies that
is significant. Furthermore, the regulations imply that no fund should
be in a controlling position.
The Canadian Mutual Funds Association Regulations are restrictive.
They deny existence to a fund that invests to control. In Canada, where
efforts are being made to create and nurture new industry, there might
well be speculative funds designed to finance and to start junior corn-
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panies; there is no reason why funds should have to hold out the
promise of safety and security to the investor who wants speculation.
Most mutual funds presently do not have the kind of management to
assume operative control of portfolio companies. Should the way be
opened to such control, however, the requisite management might de-
velop.
The necessity of a fund's honoring its pledge of redemption is not
inconsistent with the development of a fund along the lines just described
so long as existing law and the reality of fund practice is recognized.
Most funds maintain positions of liquidity with a significant portion of
their assets and in addition have the legal right to tender securities in
lieu of cash.
A fund enjoys a special relationship with its shareholders. It seeks
and obtains their money by offering an investment policy and the talent
to implement that policy. It is not a relation of trust in the sense of
conservation of assets or of secure investment, and the law should play
only a marginal role in control over business judgment. An individual
should have the right to invest in speculative ventures and to assume the
corresponding loss if the venture fails. The role of the law is to assure
a full and fair statement of the investment policy. It can isolate some
of the elements vital to such a policy, such as whether the fund will
consider taking control positions in selected issues, and, if so, whether
the fund is equipped to manage control. If a fund places no limits on
its size, it could be required to state how diversification and mobility
will be achieved, and if control is not desired, how it will be avoided.
These are not difficult objectives to fulfill, but their acceptance does
force a fund to make a decision as to investment policy and, once made,
to adhere to that decision.
The likelihood of a fund actively seeking control is remote. Not
only do most mutual funds abstain from that objective, but they think it
inappropriate in terms of the industry. A bank-related fund emphasized
that the objective of the fund is to achieve a maximum return on its
investment, and that to become too heavily invested in any one com-
pany increases the risk without necessarily increasing the return.1 2
The Canadian Committee endorsed this limitation on fund behavior
and added that serious harm could result if a mutual fund were to
assume control over a public company due to the disruption of the normal
routine of the company, and the possibility of liquidation as a result
of changed investment policy, perhaps dictated by factors completely
unrelated to the company concerned. What the Committee sought from
1 2 MuTuAL FuND CommnrnE REPoR-, supra note 1, at 437.
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the fund industry was an ongoing exercise in undefined good corporate
citizenship. 6 ' Yet, to achieve the desired separation between control
and investment, the Committee used percentage limitations and was ex-
pansive in its allowance. Conventional funds could use 10 percent, and
nonconventional funds 15 percent, of their assets to acquire no more
than 20 percent of any outstanding issue which could include a maximum
of 10 percent of the voting stock; 64 however, more voting stock could
be acquired if the relevant securities administrator believed the purchase
was for investment and not control.'
The Committee recommendations perpetuate the existing system. By
implication, the government study leaves it largely to the industry to
fashion the distinction between investment and control. The difficulties
with the Committee suggestions probably will be accentuated in the
future as the market becomes more institutionalized and large funds
grow to even greater size with greater investments. In this context,
instances may arise when control is necessary to protect an investment,
but a contemplation of the fund industry in this context is beyond the
scope of the Committee Report.
163 See id.
1641d. at 439-42. In this regard the count would be based on mutual funds subject
to the same management company. Thus, if Funds A, B, C, D, and E, though individually
incorporated, were each under common management, and held 2 percent each of
Company Z's voting stock, the maximum of 10 percent would be achieved.
15 Id. at 441.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
United Accumulative Fund Ltd.
Limitations on Portfolio Holdings
as of December 31, 1967
% il % in
Market relation relation
Securities Held Value of to Funds to o/s of
securities total Portfolio
Name of Portfolio Company Class Amount held assets Company
Western Broadcasting Co. Ltd..Common
Magna Electronics ............ Common
Oshawa Wholesale Ltd ......... Class A
Oshawa Wholesale Ltd ........ Convertible
Debentures
5Y2%, 1986
Canadian British .............. Class A
Aluminum Ltd ................ Common
Harding Carpets Ltd .......... Class A
Common
$ 85,000 $1,530,000
30,000 547,500
520,000 16,120,000
1,000,000 2,220,000
100,000 1,637,500
108,000 1,255,500
International
Business Machines ............ Common 50,000
Markborough Properties Ltd... Common 250,000
Warrants to
purchase 62,500
common
shares
Wardair Canada Ltd .......... 6Y2% Series
"A" Convert-
ible Debent- 400,000
ures due Sept.
15, 1982
Elcor Chemical Corp .......... 52% Convert-
ible Debent- 1,500,000
ures due
Nov. 1,
1987
0.4%
0.1
4.2
0.6
0.4
0.3
31,350,000 8.3
1,718,750 0.5
212,500 0.1
500,000 0.1
1,432,500 0.4
Source: Canadian Committee on Mutual Funds and Investment Contracts.
9.7%
8.6
10.2
12.5
9.2
10.3
Negligible
6.9
20.8
13.3
12.0
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TABLE2
Investors Mutual of Canada Ltd.
Limitations on Portfolio Holdings
as of December 31, 1967
Anglo-American Corporation
of Canada .................. Common $ 546,239 $5,462,390 0.9% 6.5%
Calgary Power ................ Common 332,800 7,779,200 1.3 6.3
Investors International
Mutual Fund Ltd ............ Special 548,188 4,275,869 0.7 8.7
Steinbergs .................... Class A 280,700 4,771,900 0.8 7.6
TABLE 8
Investors Growth Fund of Canada Ltd.
Limitations on Portfolio Holdings
as of December 31, 1967
Indal Canada ................. Common $ 52,500 $ 288,750 0.1% 8.9%
F.P.E. Pioneer Electric ........ Class A 71,910 2,013,480 0.9 31.0
M. Loeb. Ltd ................. Common 140,000 1,785,000 0.8 5.4
Markborough Properties ....... Common 330,000 2,268,750 1.0 9.1
Maclean-Hunter Publishing.... Common 32,000 2,112,000 0.9 6.4
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